THIS article is a perfect example of the immoral expansion of American military involvement in countries around the world as presented in DRIFT The Unmooring of American Military Power, by Rachel Maddow ( I am really enjoying this book). War is business and the military-industrial complex is dictating American foreign and military policy to maintain and increase their profit margins at the expense of American taxpayers and to the detriment of American domestic policy and foreign relations. The use of contractors to carry out American military operations allows actions that can lead to open conflict and expand to war without a constitutionally mandated vote on the U.S. going to war. These contractors often do more harm than good in the countries they are operating in, causing resentment of and hostility to American involvement in their governments and countries. Too often, if there wasn't an active, militant, violent opposition in the host country before the contractors arrived one develops. The Pentagon is sending mercenaries who are not accountable by U.S. or local laws for any crimes committed, and the contractors employees are usually nothing more than American government sanctioned gangs. If any of these operations are legitimate they should be approved by Congress and staffed by American military personnel only, and coupled with State Department programs on encouraging and empowering democratic institutions in the host country, supporting universal human rights and providing aid for the development of the local economy. Politically and economically stable allies in Africa are much more cost effective in quashing terrorist activity than corrupting military involvement. Our present activities will only fan the flames of radicalism, the cycle of conflict will continue and the U.S. military-industrial complex will become richer. This from the Washington Post...
OUAGADOUGOU, Burkina Faso — The U.S. military is expanding its secret
intelligence operations across Africa, establishing a network of small
air bases to spy on terrorist hideouts from the fringes of the Sahara to
jungle terrain along the equator, according to documents and people
involved in the project.
At the heart of the surveillance operations are small, unarmed
turboprop aircraft disguised as private planes. Equipped with hidden
sensors that can record full-motion video, track infrared heat patterns,
and vacuum up radio and cellphone signals, the planes refuel on
isolated airstrips favored by African bush pilots, extending their
effective flight range by thousands of miles.
About a dozen air
bases have been established in Africa since 2007, according to a former
senior U.S. commander involved in setting up the network. Most are small
operations run out of secluded hangars at African military bases or
civilian airports.
The nature and extent of the missions, as well
as many of the bases being used, have not been previously reported but
are partially documented in public Defense Department contracts. The
operations have intensified in recent months, part of a growing shadow
war against al-Qaeda affiliates and other militant groups. The
surveillance is overseen by U.S. Special Operations forces but relies
heavily on private military contractors and support from African troops.
The
surveillance underscores how Special Operations forces, which have
played an outsize role in the Obama administration’s national security
strategy, are working clandestinely all over the globe, not just in war
zones. The lightly equipped commando units train foreign security forces
and perform aid missions, but they also include teams dedicated to
tracking and killing terrorism suspects.
The establishment of the Africa missions also highlights the ways
in which Special Operations forces are blurring the lines that govern
the secret world of intelligence, moving aggressively into spheres once
reserved for the CIA. The CIA has expanded its counterterrorism and
intelligence-gathering operations in Africa, but its manpower and
resources pale in comparison with those of the military.
U.S.
officials said the African surveillance operations are necessary to
track terrorist groups that have taken root in failed states on the
continent and threaten to destabilize neighboring countries.
A hub for secret network
A key hub of the U.S. spying network can be found in Ouagadougou
(WAH-gah-DOO-goo), the flat, sunbaked capital of Burkina Faso, one of
the most impoverished countries in Africa.
Under a classified
surveillance program code-named Creek Sand, dozens of U.S. personnel and
contractors have come to Ouagadougou in recent years to establish a
small air base on the military side of the international airport.
The unarmed U.S. spy planes fly hundreds of miles north to Mali, Mauritania and the Sahara, where they search for fighters from
al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, a regional network that kidnaps Westerners for ransom.
The surveillance flights have taken on added importance in the turbulent aftermath of
a March coup in Mali, which has enabled al-Qaeda sympathizers to declare
an independent Islamist state in the northern half of the country.
Elsewhere,
commanders have said they are increasingly worried about the spread of
Boko Haram, an Islamist group in Nigeria blamed for a rash of bombings
there. U.S. forces are orchestrating a regional intervention in Somalia
to target
al-Shabab, another al-Qaeda affiliate.
In Central Africa, about 100 American Special Operations troops are
helping to coordinate the hunt for Joseph Kony, the Ugandan leader of
a brutal guerrilla group known as the Lord’s Resistance Army.
The
results of the American surveillance missions are shrouded in secrecy.
Although the U.S. military has launched airstrikes and raids in Somalia,
commanders said that in other places, they generally limit their
involvement to sharing intelligence with allied African forces so they
can attack terrorist camps on their own territory.
The creeping
U.S. military involvement in long-simmering African conflicts, however,
carries risks. Some State Department officials have expressed
reservations about the militarization of U.S. foreign policy on the
continent. They have argued that most terrorist cells in Africa are
pursuing local aims, not global ones, and do not present a direct threat
to the United States.
The potential for creating a popular backlash can be seen across the Red Sea, where
an escalating campaign of U.S. drone strikes in Yemen is
angering tribesmen and generating sympathy for an al-Qaeda franchise there.
In
a response to written questions from The Washington Post, the U.S.
Africa Command said that it would not comment on “specific operational
details.”
“We do, however, work closely with our African partners
to facilitate access, when required, to conduct missions or operations
that support and further our mutual security goals,” the command said.
Surveillance
and intelligence-gathering operations, it added, are “simply a tool we
employ to enable host nation militaries to better understand the threat
picture.”
Uncovering the details
The U.S. military has largely kept details of its spy flights in
Africa secret. The Post pieced together descriptions of the surveillance
network by examining references to it in unclassified military reports,
U.S. government contracting documents and
diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks, the anti-secrecy group.
Further details were provided by interviews with American and African officials, as well as military contractors.
In
addition to Burkina Faso, U.S. surveillance planes have operated
periodically out of nearby Mauritania. In Central Africa, the main hub
is in Uganda, though there are plans to open a base in South Sudan. In
East Africa, U.S. aircraft fly out of
bases in Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya and the Indian Ocean
archipelago of the Seychelles.
Army Gen. Carter F. Ham,
the head of U.S. Africa Command, which is responsible for military
operations on the continent, hinted at the importance and extent of the
air bases while testifying before Congress in March. Without divulging
locations, he made clear that, in Africa, he wanted to expand “ISR,” the
military’s acronym for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.
“Without
operating locations on the continent, ISR capabilities would be
curtailed, potentially endangering U.S. security,” Ham said in a
statement submitted to the House Armed Services Committee. “Given the
vast geographic space and diversity in threats, the command requires
increased ISR assets to adequately address the security challenges on
the continent.”
Some of the U.S. air bases, including ones in Djibouti, Ethiopia and
the Seychelles, fly
Predator and Reaper drones, the original and upgraded models,
respectively, of the remotely piloted aircraft that the Obama
administration has used to kill al-Qaeda leaders in Pakistan and Yemen.
“We
don’t have remotely piloted aircraft in many places other than East
Africa, but we could,” said a senior U.S. military official, who spoke
on the condition of anonymity to discuss intelligence matters. “If there
was a need to do so and those assets were available, I’m certain we
could get the access and the overflight [permission] that is necessary
to do that.”
Common aircraft
Most of the spy flights in Africa, however, take off the
old-fashioned way — with pilots in the cockpit. The conventional
aircraft hold two big advantages over drones: They are cheaper to
operate and far less likely to draw attention because they are so
similar to the planes used throughout Africa.
The bulk of the U.S. surveillance fleet is composed of single-engine
Pilatus PC-12s,
small passenger and cargo utility planes manufactured in Switzerland.
The aircraft are not equipped with weapons. They often do not bear
military markings or government insignia.
The Pentagon began
acquiring the planes in 2005 to fly commandos into territory where the
military wanted to maintain a clandestine presence. The Air Force
variant of the aircraft is known as the
U-28A. The Air Force Special Operations Command has about 21 of the planes in its inventory.
In
February, a U-28A crashed as it was returning to Camp Lemonnier in
Djibouti, the only permanent U.S. military base in Africa. Four airmen
from the Air Force Special Operations Command were killed. It was the
first reported fatal incident involving a U-28A since the military began
deploying the aircraft six years ago.
Air Force officials said
that the crash was an accident and that they are investigating the
cause. Military officials declined to answer questions about the
flight’s mission.
Because of its strategic location on the Horn of Africa,
Camp Lemonnier is a hub for spy flights in the region. It
is about 500 miles from southern Somalia, an area largely controlled by
the al-Shabab militia. Lemonnier is even closer — less than 100 miles —
to Yemen, where another al-Qaeda franchise has expanded its influence
and plotted attacks against the United States.
Elsewhere in
Africa, the U.S. military is relying on private contractors to provide
and operate PC-12 spy planes in the search for Kony, the fugitive leader
of the Lord’s Resistance Army, a group known for mutilating victims,
committing mass rape and enslaving children as soldiers.
Ham, the
Africa Command chief, said in his testimony to Congress in March that he
was seeking to establish a base for surveillance flights in Nzara,
South Sudan. Although that would bolster the hunt for Kony, who is
wanted by the International Criminal Court, it would also enable the
U.S. military to keep an eye on the worsening conflict between Sudan and
South Sudan. The two countries fought a civil war for more than two
decades and are
on the verge of war again, in part over potentially rich oil deposits valued by foreign investors.
Other
aviation projects are in the offing. An engineering battalion of Navy
Seabees has been assigned to complete a $10 million runway upgrade this
summer at the Manda Bay Naval Base, a Kenyan military installation on
the Indian Ocean. An Africa Command spokeswoman said the runway
extension is necessary so American C-130 troop transport flights can
land at night and during bad weather.
About 120 U.S. military
personnel and contractors are stationed at Manda Bay, which Navy SEALs
and other commandos have used as a base from which to conduct raids
against Somali pirates and al-Shabab fighters.
About 6,000 miles
to the west, the Pentagon is spending $8.1 million to upgrade a forward
operating base and airstrip in Mauritania, on the western edge of the
Sahara. The base is near the border with strife-torn Mali.
The
Defense Department also set aside $22.6 million in July to buy a Pilatus
PC-6 aircraft and another turboprop plane so U.S.-trained Mauritanian
security forces can conduct rudimentary surveillance operations,
according to documents submitted to Congress.
Crowding the embassy
The U.S. military began building its presence in Burkina Faso in 2007,
when it signed a deal that enabled the Pentagon to establish a Joint
Special Operations Air Detachment in Ouagadougou. At the time, the U.S.
military said the arrangement would support “medical evacuation and
logistics requirements” but provided no other details.
By the end
of 2009, about 65 U.S. military personnel and contractors were working
in Burkina Faso, more than in all but three other African countries,
according to a U.S. Embassy cable from Ouagadougou. In the cable,
diplomats complained to the State Department that the onslaught of U.S.
troops and support staff had “completely overwhelmed” the embassy.
In
addition to Pilatus PC-12 flights for Creek Sand, the U.S. military
personnel in Ouagadougou ran a regional intelligence “fusion cell”
code-named Aztec Archer,
according to the cable.
Burkina
Faso, a predominantly Muslim country whose name means “the land of
upright men,” does not have a history of radicalism. U.S. military
officials saw it as an attractive base because of its strategic location
bordering the Sahel, the arid region south of the Sahara where
al-Qaeda’s North African affiliate is active.
Unlike many other
governments in the region, the one in Burkina Faso was relatively
stable. The U.S. military operated Creek Sand spy flights from
Nouakchott, Mauritania, until 2008, when
a military coup forced Washington to suspend relations and end the surveillance, according to former U.S. officials and diplomatic cables.
In
Ouagadougou, both sides have worked hard to keep the partnership quiet.
In a July 2009 meeting, Yero Boly, the defense minister of Burkina
Faso, told a U.S. Embassy official that he was pleased with the results.
But he confessed he was nervous that the unmarked American planes might
draw “undue attention” at the airport in the heart of the capital and
suggested that they move to a more secluded hangar.
“According to
Boly, the present location of the aircraft was in retrospect not an
ideal choice in that it put the U.S. aircraft in a section of the
airfield that already had too much traffic,”
according to a diplomatic cable summarizing the meeting. “He also commented that U.S. personnel were extremely discreet.”
U.S.
officials raised the possibility of basing the planes about 220 miles
to the west, in the city of Bobo Dioulasso, according to the cable. Boly
said that the Americans could use that airport on a “short term or
emergency basis” but that a U.S. presence there “would likely draw
greater attention.”
In an interview with The Post, Djibril
Bassole, the foreign minister of Burkina Faso, praised security
relations between his country and the United States, saying they were
crucial to containing al-Qaeda forces in the region.
“We need to
fight and protect our borders,” he said. “Once they infiltrate your
country, it’s very, very difficult to get them out.”
Bassole declined, however, to answer questions about the activities of U.S. Special Operations forces in his country.
“I
cannot provide details, but it has been very, very helpful,” he said.
“This cooperation should be very, very discreet. We should not show to
al-Qaeda that we are now working with the Americans.”
Discretion
is not always strictly observed. In interviews last month, residents of
Ouagadougou said American service members and contractors stand out,
even in plainclothes, and are appreciated for the steady business they
bring to bars and a pizzeria in the city center.
In April 2010,
one American, in particular, drew attention. A U.S. contractor who had
been assigned to support the surveillance missions in Ouagadougou was
flying home from Africa on leave when he announced that he had been “in
Ouaga illegally” and was carrying dynamite in his boots and laptop. As the contractor, Derek Stansberry, mumbled other incoherent stories about allegedly top-secret operations, he was
grabbed by U.S. air marshals aboard the Paris-to-Atlanta flight. No explosives were found, but the incident drew international attention.
Stansberry,
who did not respond to a request for comment, was found not guilty by
reason of temporary insanity; he said he was overstressed and had
overdosed on the sleep aid Ambien.
A photograph on his Facebook
page around the time of the incident showed him posing in the cockpit of
a Pilatus aircraft. The caption read: “Flying a PC-12 ain’t that hard.”
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-expands-secret-intelligence-operations-in-africa/2012/06/13/gJQAHyvAbV_print.html