BUCKNACKT'S SORDID TAWDRY BLOG
We should not be a journey to the grave with the intention of arriving safely in an attractive & well preserved body, but rather to skid in sideways, chocolate, bier or wein in hand, body thoroughly used up, totally worn out and screaming "WHOO-HOO, WHAT A RIDE!!!!!!"
THIS report from TRNN / The Real News Network lays out the manipulation of the Arab Spring movement by various regional as well as international powers attempting to protect their own power, control and the status quo in their nations and international relationships. The specific focus of this report is Syria and it's civil war. What is interesting, and extremely disturbing but actually not surprising, is the lack of concern for the welfare of the refugees in and outside Syria as well as the desire for freedom, democracy, human rights and economic rights and freedoms that have been the catalyst for the revolutions, civil wars and political unrest in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq and Syria. These players, manipulators seeking to protect their power and wealth at the expense of the lives of the common person, in this case the average Syrian, are no better than assad....
Published on Feb 13, 2014
Hamid Dabashi: All foreign nations involved in Syria are attempting to quell the revolutionary uprisings for their economic and strategic interests, but the Syrian people will ultimately decide their own future watch full multipart http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?o...
Saudi Arabia and Iran Share A Common Goal in Syria
Hamid Dabashi: All foreign nations involved in Syria are attempting to quell
the revolutionary uprisings for economic and strategic interests, but
the Syrian people will ultimately decide their own future - February 14, 2014
Hamid Dabashi is the Hagop
Kevorkian Professor of Iranian Studies and Comparative Literature at
Columbia University. He received a dual Ph.D. in Sociology of Culture
and Islamic Studies from the University of Pennsylvania in 1984,
followed by a postdoctoral fellowship at Harvard University. He wrote
his dissertation on Max Weber's theory of charismatic authority with
Philip Rieff (1922-2006), the most distinguished Freudian cultural
critic of his time. Professor Dabashi has taught and delivered lectures
in many North American, European, Arab, and Iranian universities.
Professor
Dabashi has written twenty-five books, edited four, and contributed
chapters to many more. He is also the author of over 100 essays,
articles and book reviews on subjects ranging from Iranian Studies,
medieval and modern Islam, and comparative literature to world cinema
and the philosophy of art (trans-aesthetics). His books and articles
have been translated into numerous languages, including Japanese,
German, French, Spanish, Danish, Russian, Hebrew, Italian, Arabic,
Korean, Persian, Portuguese, Polish, Turkish, Urdu and Catalan.
JESSICA DESVARIEUX, TRNN PRODUCER: Welcome to The Real News Network. I'm Jessica Desvarieux in Baltimore.Now joining us is our guest, Hamid Dabashi. We're picking up our conversation where we left it off.Hamid is a professor of Iranian studies and comparative literature at Columbia University.Thanks for being with us, Hamid.HAMID DABASHI, PROF. IRANIAN STUDIES AND COMPARATIVE LIT., COLUMBIA UNIV.: Any time, Jessica.DESVARIEUX: So, Hamid, my first question is really to discuss Syria. Why is Syria of strategic importance to Iran?DABASHI:
Over the last 30 years, since the inception of Islamic Republic--in
fact, more accurately, since 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, a
strategic alliance developed between Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas.
And they called this line of connection /mo'rAb@nA/, resistance.
So Iran, Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Hamas in Palestine, they
formed a line of resistance vis-à-vis Israel and its support by United
States. This was the scenario that was operative and working, to
whatever degree a limited imagination that this kind of war of attrition
could possibly sustain, until the rise of the Arab revolutions in 2011.
That began to change the scenario radically. And if you go back and
look, immediately Hamas realized that its interests, the interests of
the Palestinians and the interests of Hamas, is actually in connection
with these revolutionary uprisings, and they began to side with the
revolution, they began to support the Egyptian revolutions, and they
decoupled themselves from Syria. This was a very important move.Hezbollah,
on the other hand, denounced the revolutionary uprising. I mean, the
social movement in Iran, the Green movement, Hassan Nasrallah dismissed
it as inspired by United States. And then, when the trouble began in
Syria, Hassan Nasrallah and Hezbollah refused to dissociate themselves
with Bashar al-Assad. And as a result, the credibility that Hassan
Nasrallah and Hezbollah had created for itself since the war of 2006,
that they have become the hero of the Arab world, they categorically
lost it. They now have fighters inside the Syria. They have been
projected, and they are in fact as a force against the Syrian interest.So,
because of the Arab revolution, that alliance began to crumble by,
first, Hamas decoupling from it, and Hezbollah using credibility. So all
remaining was Iran and Syria. Iran has invested heavily strategically,
militarily, intelligence-wise, in every possible ways in keeping Bashar
al-Assad in power, not, as I said earlier, because they have a love
affair with Bashar al-Assad, but they just want to make sure that the
interests in the region, and particularly in Syria, are kept intact. And
as a result, what we are witnessing today, namely the scenario that
China, because of its economic interests, Russia, because of its
economic and strategic interests, and Iran, for similar reasons, are
siding with Bashar al-Assad, whereas U.S., Israel, Saudi Arabia, and
others are against that coalition. However, that coalition
is--on both sides are very fragile. Why? Because the will of the Syrian
people, who are the majority of nonviolent people who began the
peaceful revolution two and a half years ago, are very much the people
who ultimately will decide the future of Syria. So all these
machinations that are happening at the state level, in terms of the
geopolitics of the region, are only successful to the point that they
finally come to a strategic resolution. But when they come down from
their horses and Humvees to rule, they will see that the Syrians are not
going to be the same Syrians who have been brutalized by the Assad
dynasty for half a century.DESVARIEUX: So, Hamid, I want
to go back to the point that you made about how Iran invested heavily in
keeping Assad in power. But now we're sort of seeing the weakening of
his regime in the Geneva II talks, Kerry's public statements that he's
made. I want to get your impression. Do you think that at the end of the
day, Iran is going to throw Assad under the bus?DABASHI:
Oh, absolutely. Iran, as I said, has no personal commitment to Bashar
al-Assad. Iran simply wants to make sure that it is a player in the
region. As you remember, UN initially invited Iran to join the
negotiations in Geneva II, but then they disinvited them. The fact is
that without Iran, there cannot be--Lakhdar Brahimi has repeatedly said
that without Iran, there cannot be a resolution to the Syrian crisis.
And Iran knows that fact, because Iran is on the ground. The military
intelligence apparatus of Islamic Republic is inside Syria. And they
want to use that as a leverage, not to keep Bashar al-Assad in power,
but to make sure that the regional interests are protected in the
aftermath of Bashar al-Assad.This same scenario's actually
applicable to the Russians. Russians were cheated out of the
post-Gaddafi scenario in Libya, and they don't want to see it happen in
Syria as well. Because of these revolutions, Jessica,
these uprisings, the counterrevolutionary forces that ranged from China
and Russia and comes down to Iran and Syria and Israel and Qatar and all
of these forces, they have mobilized to see how they can stabilize. The
term, for them, is stabilize the situation. So,
historically, we have to keep our eyes on the ball. What is the ball?
Masses of millions of people have risen against tyranny and against
abuse and for their civil liberties and for their ability to unionize,
to have their women's rights and similar civil liberties. And
against this we have a constellation of counterrevolutionary forces
that on the surface may appear to be at odds. Saudi Arabia may seem to
be at odds with the Islamic Republic. But ultimately they have one goal:
to quell these revolutionary uprisings for their own interest.DESVARIEUX: Alright. Hamid Dabashi, it's always a fascinating history lesson with you. Thank you.DABASHI: Absolutely. My pleasure. Any time.DESVARIEUX: And thank you for joining us on The Real News Network.
Tracking the casualties of Syria's civil war has been
difficult, if not impossible, from the very start. Since March 2011, the United
Nations has struggled to glean reliable information from the fog of war. The
U.N. has relied on theHuman Rights Data
Analysis Group (HRDAG), a San Francisco-based non-profit "that applies
rigorous science to the analysis of human rights violations around the world,"
to sort through data from eight different sources including independent
observatories and Syrian human rights watchers. (Read Tina Rosenberg's fascinating profile
of Patrick Ball and the methodology behind HRDAG's numbers, written
back when the body count in Syria was estimated at less than 10,000.)
Killings were counted only if
the name of the victim and the date and location of death were known,
making
the figures provided by the United Nations and HRDAG non-exhaustive;
rather,
they are the minimum number of people who have died in Syria.
Last week, the United Nations said it would no longer be
updating its casualty figures. "It was always a very difficult
figure," a U.N. spokesmantold the Associated Press. "It was always
very close to the edge in terms of how much we could guarantee the source
material was accurate. And it reached a point where we felt we could no longer
cross that line. So for the time being, we're not updating those figures."
The last time the United Nations announced casualty figures for
the Syrian civil war was when the tally surpassed the 100,000 death threshold
in July 2013.
The lack of access for reporters and humanitarian agencies within Syria
has only made this task more difficult. Whether an authoritative tally
of casualties in Syria will ever be possible remains an open question,
but one thing is clear: over the past three years, the violence has
spread dramatically. From the early hotbeds of
resistance in Hama and Homs, to the political and cultural hubs of
Damascus
and Aleppo, to the Syrian borderlands and the Kurdish northeast, the war
has metastasized.
This map illustrates
what that toll looks like across space and time.
It visualizes
the approximately 74,000 people who died from March 2011 to November 2013. Every
flare represents the death of one or more people, the most common causes being shooting, shelling, and
field execution. The brighter a flare is, the
more people died in that specific time and place. The data used are drawn from
the Violations Documentation Center (VDC), the documentation arm of the Local
Coordination Committees in Syria which has been one of the eight sources on
which HRDAG has based its count. In a June 2013 report,
HRDAG cited VDC as the most thorough accounting of casualties in Syria,
though the dataset has been found to contain some inconsistencies.
Inaccurate data that has been found in these datasets has been removed,
but because of the difficulty of reporting casualties in Syria, this
should not be considered a 100 percent accurate or exhaustive
documentation of Syrian war deaths. Indeed, it almost certainly is
affected by a selection
bias that favors reporting casualties in more scrutinized areas while
neglecting violence in more remote areas. The VDC has also noted that
some
families decline to report casualties for fear of being targeted again.
What the map
demonstrates is the escalation of the conflict -- with data from March 2011 through
the VDC's Nov. 21, 2013 report -- and its quick descent from being a smattering
of violence to a multi-front war with militias challenging the military (and other militias) almost
everywhere at once. What it can't show, of course, is the horror and destruction of this war.
THE Arab Spring started four years ago, and much of the Arab world is still in upheaval along with the civil war in Syria and political instability in Egypt. Here is a study from the University of Michigan of the public opinions on the changes that have taken place and the the desires of the people of Tunisia, where the Arab Spring started. See more at Why the next wave of Arab awakening
should be waged for pluralism & Tunisia struggles to reset its
democracy & Unlikely Heroes Of The Arab Spring 9JAN14&25NOV13
http://bucknacktssordidtawdryblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/why-next-wave-of-arab-awakening-should.html
Posted on
“Do
not put garbage in our mind,” reads graffiti printed on the wall of the
Roads Administration Office of Tunis City Hall at Fasqiah Warehouse,
which is in charge of road maintenance and cleaning.
ANN ARBOR—Public attitudes in Tunisia, the birthplace of the Arab
Spring, show strong support for secular politics and religious
moderation and tolerance, according to a University of Michigan survey conducted earlier this year.
The findings help to explain the political agreement just reached
between Islamists and members of secular groups to form a new Tunisian
coalition government.
The survey is part of the Cross-National Analysis of Religious
Fundamentalism Study, a systematic study of religious, liberal and other
cultural values in seven Middle Eastern countries with Muslim majority
populations: Tunisia, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and
Turkey.
“Religious tolerance is stronger in Tunisia than in the other six countries we’ve studied,” said Mansoor Moaddel, principal investigator of the study.
The results come from face-to-face interviews with a nationally representative sample of approximately 3,000 Tunisian adults.
“But despite public support for the kinds of values that are the basis
of American democracy, attitudes towards Americans, while more favorable
than in other Middle Eastern countries, have much room for
improvement,” said Moaddel, who is affiliated with the University of
Michigan Institute for Social Research and the University of Maryland.
Among the key findings of the survey:
Fully 76 percent believed that the Arab Spring was for democracy and
economic prosperity; only 9 percent said it was for the establishment
of an Islamic government.
More than 60 percent said that current political leaders made them
upset or angry and fully 86 percent said that government corruption was
common.
A majority of respondents said that life in Tunisia is better now than it was before the revolution.
More than 60 percent said the most important obligation for
Tunisians was to excel in science and technology, compared to 18 percent
who identified the top priority as applying sharia law.
Compared to the people of other countries studied, Tunisians were
much more likely to say that they would like to have Americans as
neighbors. And along with Pakistani and Turkish respondents, they were
much less likely than Egyptians, Iraqis, Lebanese and Saudis to support
attacks on U.S. civilians working for American companies in Islamic
countries. A major division in value orientations was between Tunisians,
Lebanese and Turkish, who were more liberal, and Egyptians, Iraqis,
Pakistanis and Saudis, who were more conservative.
The study is supported by the U.S. Office of Naval Research, Africom,
MITRE, Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, Eastern Michigan
University, University of Michigan and Göettingen University.
The
“Arab street” is a popular cliché used to describe what people are
thinking in the Middle East. But it’s rarely clear how opinions are
collected on this proverbial street.
One thing is obvious: There is serious need for a better
understanding of the public’s views in the Arab world as the region
copes with ongoing social, economic and political challenges.
The University of Michigan is making a significant contribution to
meeting this need. Partnering with Qatar University, U-M has helped
create an institute that is doing the most rigorous, state-of-the-art
social science research in the Arab Gulf. It’s also among the very best
research centers of its kind in the entire Arab region.
Morning in Souq Waqif, Qatar. Photo by Thinkstock.
“There’s no place that comes close to what we and our Qatari partners are doing,” said Mark Tessler, a U-M political science professor and one of the principal investigators in the initiative.
The surveys the institute conducts focus on governance, education,
youth, social values, identity, health, gender relations, labor and many
other important issues.
The center—called the Social and Economic Survey Research Institute—started
five years ago when Qatar University decided to enhance its social
science research capacity and began looking for partners. U-M was sought
out partly because the university is home to the Institute for Social
Research—the world’s largest academic social science survey and research
organization. Experience in conducting public opinion surveys and
training programs in the Arab world also led the Qataris to U-M.
It didn’t take the Qataris long to pick a partner.
“We gave them a plan about what we thought they needed to do, key
positions to fill, organizational structures and examples of worthwhile
projects,” Tessler said. “They took it to their board and came back in a
few months and said they wanted to work with us.”
Mark Tessler (left) with SESRI director Darwish Al-Emadi
U-M was impressed by the Qatari vision and the prospects for making a
significant contribution and readily agreed to the partnership, Tessler
said.
Before the 1930s, Qatar was impoverished and known mostly for pearl
trading. But the discovery of oil and gas has transformed the tiny Gulf
state on the Arabian Peninsula into one of the richest countries in the
world. And it’s investing heavily in education, including women’s
education.
“They’re creating a knowledge economy,” said David Howell, associate
director of ISR’s Center for Political Studies and also a principal
investigator in the initiative. “They could sit back and just take
advantage of their natural resources, but they’re reinvesting it to
understand their society better and make it a better place for the
people who live there. I think that’s impressive.”
Since beginning work in 2009, the institute has carried out about 30
national and regional surveys. Many focus not only on Qatari citizens
but also on the country’s huge expatriate community, which makes up more
than 80 percent of the population.
The studies have included an annual omnibus survey that tracks
continuity and change over time in people’s views and perceptions on key
issues such as education, media habits, gender relations and the status
of women.
Results from the 2012 omnibus survey included:
77 percent of Qataris believe it is “important” or “very important” to live in a country that is ruled democratically.
70 percent of Qataris said television was their main source of news.
The majority of male (58 percent) and female (68 percent)
respondents agreed or strongly agreed that men and women should share
equal status in society.
Tessler said that such surveys are vital for good governance.
“It’s important to know what people think and value,” said Tessler,
who also co-directs another multicountry survey project called the Arab Barometer
and who has organized survey research training programs in six Arab
countries.”We believe that policymakers and officials will be more
responsive if information about what the public wants and thinks is
available.”
All of the surveys are done face to face, not by telephone, by scores
of well-trained and experienced interviewers, Howell said. They use
laptops programmed to collect data and send it back to researchers in
real time so that the information can be monitored for quality.
“One nice thing is that, unlike Americans, Qataris are not used to
being surveyed all the time, so they’re not oversaturated,” Howell said.
Last November, U-M renewed its five-year partnership agreement with
Qatar University. One of the next objectives is to create a policy
center at the institute that will take greater advantage of the survey
data—not just for academic purposes but also to assist and better inform
the country’s policymakers, Tessler said.
“That’s important for planning, setting priorities and getting feedback on what seems to be working and not working,” he said.
Howell said the institute is an example of what U-M does so well
around the world: capacity building—creating infrastructure that is
sustainable and doesn’t depend on U-M to maintain it.
“This is something Michigan can pull out of at some point, and it
would still be great,” he said. “It would move on, survive well and be
high quality.”
I remember my Uncle Bud talking about his service in Vietnam as a Green Beret. He said when he would meet with village chiefs in the Highlands they would tell him they didn't care about the Viet Cong or the ARVN or U.S. troops. All they wanted to be left alone, to farm, send their children to school and hope for a better life for them. These two reports on the Arab Spring of 2010 show people across the Maghreb, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf want the same thing, and have overthrown the governments of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen in an attempt for freedom and democracy, economic freedom and human rights. They are still challenging the ruling powers in the four nations above as well as every government in the Arab world, tired of the corruption and repression that keep them in poverty and without rights. The hundreds of millions in the Arab world who have taken to the streets in nonviolent protest (and those fighting in Syria's civil war) want the same things the Vietnamese village chiefs wanted 40+ years ago, what people around the world want, to be able to work, provide for their families, educate their children, improve their lives and have freedom and their human rights protected and respected. From the PBS NewHour and the Free To Choose Network (click the where to watch link to see Unlikely Heroes Of The Arab Spring).....
SUMMARY
Marwan Muasher, the former deputy prime
minister of Jordan, thinks it was too simplistic for the world to
expect that the Arab Spring would so quickly evolve autocracies into
democracies. Margaret Warner sits down with Muasher to discuss his new
book, "The Second Arab Awakening: And the Battle for Pluralism."
GWEN IFILL: Finally tonight: What's become
of the Arab spring? In 2011, there was great hope that democracy would
replace authoritarian regimes in a number of countries in the Middle
East, but that's not exactly what happened.
Chief foreign affairs correspondent Margaret Warner explains why.
MARGARET WARNER: As the fourth year of the Arab spring begins, the Middle East is seeing fresh waves of violence of widening scope.
In Syria, Sunni-led rebels long fighting President Bashar al-Assad's
forces are now battling jihadi extremist units as well. In Iraq, where
Sunnis are protesting the Shiite-dominated government of Prime Minister
Maliki, militants linked to al-Qaida have seized key western cities. And
in Lebanon, spillover from the Syria conflict has triggered car bomb
assassinations of top Sunni figures and bombings of Shiite neighborhoods
in Southern Beirut.
Marwan Muasher, former foreign minister and deputy prime minister of
Jordan, takes a long view of all this in his new book, "The Second Arab
Awakening and the Battle for Pluralism."
We sat down for a conversation about it at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Marwan Muasher, thank you for joining us.
What you call the second Arab awakening has so far seemed to have
unleashed, basically, chaos and violence in Syria and in Libya, and new
forms of undemocratic rule in Egypt, even Tunisia. Why is that? MARWAN MUASHER, former Jordanian official: There is
no transformational process in history that occurred the course of a
short three years. The Arab world is no different.
The Arab world was living under a state of artificially induced
stability for a long time, non-democratic governments, an Islamic
opposition which promised the moon and did not -- was not put to the
test to deliver on any of its promises.
Now that the lid has been taken off, all kinds of issues are coming
out. So I think while it was simplistic to call it an Arab spring right
after it occurred, expecting, you know, autocracies to evolve into
democracies overnight, it is equally simplistic to think that this is an
Arab winter, and that this is necessarily how the process will end. MARGARET WARNER: So, do you think that this region will move to some sort of stable, but also open and democratic rule? MARWAN MUASHER: I think what we have already seen is
the bankruptcy of both the secular regimes and forces that are
attempting to rule without a system of checks and balances and of a
religious opposition which is promising the moon, but has not delivered
on results.
That vacuum, if you will, that bankruptcy of both the secular and the
religious forces has not been filled yet. Obviously, radical forces,
al-Qaida types in Syria and other places, are attempting to make use of
that to their own advantage.
So far, what we have not seen are third forces which are, you know,
for democracy, for pluralism, assert themselves in this new
transformation, and to present themselves as credible alternatives, both
to the religious opposition that is there in the Arab world and to the
secular, both regimes and forces who are also behaving in an
exclusionist manner, and not really putting in place institutions that
would assure a democratic and pluralistic culture. MARGARET WARNER: Do you think there's anything in
the sort of Arab culture or cultural DNA of this region that makes
whoever gets in power embrace a kind of zero sum game, exclusive form of
governing? MARWAN MUASHER: Absolutely not.
What we are witnessing is a direct result of an era in the Arab world
where democracy was not practiced nor encouraged, an educational system
which basically taught people just to blindly follow leaders without
critical thinking, without asking questions.
So, obviously, when this is disturbed, both the religious and secular
forces are behaving in nondemocratic ways. It's so far a
winner-take-all strategy. And as I say always, a zero sum game has meant
that the sum is zero so far.
Until both forces realize that this is not a battle between secular
and religious elements, until that becomes a battle for pluralism, where
everybody assures the right not only of themselves, but of others, to
operate in the political sphere, this second Arab awakening will not be
successful. MARGARET WARNER: But how do you foresee this battle
taking shape? I mean, for instance, in Egypt, the young people, the
middle-class people who came out to Tahrir Square demanding that Mubarak
go said this is what they wanted, and yet they proved incapable of
doing the hard work of building parties, and went -- and they lost the
election. MARWAN MUASHER: This is a natural process that will,
I think, take its course in Egypt, maybe 14, 15 years before we see
stability come again and before people realize that pluralism needs to
be the underlying foundation, the operating system for everything that
can be done. MARGARET WARNER: The other split, of course, we're
seeing -- and it seems to be growing wider and wider -- has been between
Sunni and Shia. Who's going to resolve that? How will that get
resolved? MARWAN MUASHER: Again, this is, I think, a result of
-- a direct result of the lack of pluralism, because the Sunni-Shiite
divide in the Arab world is not just a religious divide. It's all --
also a political divide. MARGARET WARNER: It's about power. MARWAN MUASHER: It's -- well, yes, and groups,
particularly Shiite groups in the Arab world have lived as second-class
citizens for a long time. They were not given equal rights.
In my view, if all the ethnic, religious, political groups in Arab
world are treated as equal citizens, a lot of these problems would just
disappear. But this is not going to be automatic or immediate. This is
going to take decades of work, in which you have to do things to the
educational system, the value system that exists in the Arab world. In
other words, there are no shortcuts to democracy. MARGARET WARNER: But, in the meantime as you pointed out, extremist elements, violent jihadi elements are taking advantage of this vacuum.
The U.S. has made clear it's not going to intervene in the classic
military sense. What will -- I mean, other than hoping that pluralistic
forces get their act together, what will bring this region to some sort
of stability? MARWAN MUASHER: I think the jihadi sort of phenomenon is transient in the Arab world.
The radical elements in Syria now are being fought by the moderate
Islamists themselves. This is a fight that needs to go on. But the
overwhelming majority of the Arab world do not subscribe to al-Qaida
types, do not subscribe to this jihadi radical thinking.
In the end, the street in the Arab world, just as the street in any
other place in the world, who cares about job, about improving their lot
-- they don't care about ideology and radical forces. MARGARET WARNER: And overcoming that has to be done by the people on the ground, not by outside powers. MARWAN MUASHER: Absolutely. This is a responsibility of Arabs themselves, no one else. MARGARET WARNER: Marwan Muasher, thank you. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world/jan-june14/arabspring_01-09.html
Tunisia struggles to reset its democracy
Published on Nov 25, 2013
Nearly three years after Tunisia's
revolution inspired citizens across the region, the nation that sparked
the Arab Spring has struggled with the transition away from
authoritarian rule. Filmmaker Jessie Deeter filed this report, narrated
by Hari Sreenivasan, about the mounting pressures as the society tries
to find its way.
JUDY WOODRUFF: Now to an update from the birthplace of the Arab spring, Tunisia.
The North African nation has struggled with democracy since the
ouster of its former leader nearly three years ago. That struggle is not
unique among the region's new democracies, but its attempt to right its
course is without precedent in the new Arab world.
Producer Jessie Deeter recently visited the country and filed this report narrated by Hari Sreenivasan. ANIS MOEZ, Tunisia (through interpreter): When I
used to pray, they would stop me and take my taxi permit. But now they
give it back. And I went back to work. This is the only thing I gained
from the revolution. HARI SREENIVASAN: Anis Moez suffered under former
President's Ben Ali's dictatorship in Tunisia, when Muslims were not
allowed to show outward signs of their faith, including wearing head
scarfs.
Now, like many Tunisians, he's still searching for the great promise
offered by the revolution that kicked off the Arab spring nearly three
years ago.
Nabiha Ben Said is an unemployed seamstress who had high
hopes after the revolution, but has become disillusioned with the
ruling Ennahda party she helped vote into power. NABIHA BEN SAID, Tunisia (through interpreter): My
wish? That Tunisia would stop and go back to the way we lived before.
Life has gotten more expensive, too expensive in Tunisia. The population
can't handle freedom. It's true. I swear to God. Look what freedom has
done, where it's taken us. HARI SREENIVASAN: Tunisia's revolution gave hope to
the rest of the region that democracy was possible, but the transition
from decades of authoritarian rule remains difficult.
Over the summer liberal politician Mohamed Brahmi was assassinated.
It was the second murder of a political figure in a year. The killings,
combined with frustration over high unemployment and security concerns,
set off a month-long protest and calls for the ruling Ennahda party to
dissolve government. BEJI CAID ESSEBSI, Nidaa Tounes Party (through
interpreter): They haven't been able to achieve the goals of the
revolution, in other words, the unemployment, the poverty in the
marginalized regions. HARI SREENIVASAN: Former Tunisian Prime Minister Beji Caid Essebsi heads Nidaa Tounes, the secularist main opposition party to Ennahda. BEJI CAID ESSEBSI (through interpreter): There have
been serious incidents, assassinations of politicians, which have never
happened before in Tunisia. HARI SREENIVASAN: In an extraordinary move, Ennahda,
led by Rashid al-Ghannushi, agreed to exit, rather than experience the
fate of an ouster, like Egypt's Mohammed Morsi. RASHID AL-GHANNUSHI, Ennahda Party (through
interpreter): We in the Ennahda party have accepted to step down from
the government without elections and without a coup. We will just work
toward the transition and toward democracy.
Monica Marks studies Tunisia's political system at Oxford University. MONICA MARKS, Oxford University: They realize that's
probably the best strategic option for them, because they're sitting at
the helm of government at a time of great strife. MUSTAPHA K. NABIL, former Central Bank of Tunisia:
We're in a situation now where growth is very weak, job creation is very
weak and the social tensions are high. HARI SREENIVASAN: Mustapha Nabil is the former
governor of Tunisia's Central Bank. He fears that if a new transitional
prime minister isn't chosen soon, it will be hard for Tunisia to pull
back from the upheaval created by ongoing political uncertainty. MUSTAPHA K. NABIL: You have a balance of payment
under pressure. You have banking system under pressure. So, a lot of
these things are coming now to bear, and the risks of some slippage, of
some crisis, serious crisis, are there. TAREK SPIKA, Tunisia (through interpreter): I voted
for Ennahda. The next time, I'm going to cut off his finger, this finger
that voted for Ennahda. HARI SREENIVASAN: TAREK SPIKA is a shop owner from
Gabes, an industrial town in the south of Tunisia. He says that the
government hasn't helped him gain the work and security he sought by
moving to Tunis. TAREK SPIKA (through interpreter): Before the
revolution a woman could go out in the street around 10:00 or 11:00 at
night. Now no, because the country isn't safe. MONICA MARKS: The security situation makes a lot of
people nervous, because they are used to the eerie stability of a police
state, in which nothing really ever happened.
But, for average, Tunisians this is a fragile situation, but it's
also a frightening situation. And that kind of fear and feeling of
instability I think, make people very vulnerable to these discourses of
stability, of authoritarianism bringing more stability. HARI SREENIVASAN: The main alternative to Islamist
Ennahda is Nidaa Tounes. The party has been accused of having links to
dictator Ben Ali's old regime, which was notorious for torture and
corruption. It's alleged that much of the country's business community
had direct ties to the former president.
Nidaa Tounes leader Essebsi says that he and his party shouldn't be
judged by the transgressions of some in the pre-revolution government. BEJI CAID ESSEBSI (through interpreter): I have been
in politics since March 1956, independence day. I was here, and I'm
still here. But the old regime isn't all dirty, you know? There were two
million Tunisians with Ben Ali. We can't exclude them all. HARI SREENIVASAN: But the new government by its own admission has not held members of the old guard accountable for past crimes. RASHID AL-GHANNUSHI (through interpreter): We have
failed in some things. We didn't hold accountable those who were
corrupt. And so the protest against us are back because we were not
strong enough in punishing the corrupt individuals. HARI SREENIVASAN: Ennahda and its political
opponents are in gridlock over the country's future. And attempts to
agree on a caretaker prime minister have been delayed. A new election
won't happen until six or seven months after that leader is chosen. KACEM AFAYA, Workers Union of Tunisia (through
interpreter): We are currently pressuring them to convince them to reach
a consensus in order to save Tunisia.
Kacem Afaya of the UGTT union that is mediating negotiations between
the two parties is worried about the consequences of not reaching a
deal. KACEM AFAYA (through interpreter): It is critical
that we avoid a bloody confrontation. It is essential that we succeed in
bringing back safety and social stability. If we don't find a solution
in December, it will be the bankruptcy of this regime. HARI SREENIVASAN: The constituent assembly, the body
charged with rewriting Tunisia's constitution, is more than a year past
its mandated deadline and must wait until a new acting prime minister
is chosen to finish. But it, unlike other parts of the government, will
not be dissolved until the constitution has been completed.
Amel Azzouz is an Ennahda member and constituent assembly representative. AMEL AZZOUZ, Ennahda Party: We will dissolve the
government, but this constituent assembly will remain, because it the
center of democracy. It's the symbol of democracy. It's the symbol of
the will of people. And it is thanks to this assembly that we will
guarantee the movement or the transition to another period, to an
entrenched democracy and republic, a new republic. HARI SREENIVASAN: As difficult as this transition seems, experts like Monica Marks are still hopeful. MONICA MARKS: If Tunisia can pull through these next
number of years, if people can together work for compromise and have
that blitzkrieg mentality, we're going to get through this no matter
what, then Tunisia could become the first democracy in the Arab world,
and no longer can people say Arabs aren't ready for democracy. HARI SREENIVASAN: But the longer Tunisians like Anis Moez wait for the critical next steps, the further away the democracy becomes. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world/july-dec13/tunisia_11-25.html
Presented
by the award-winning author and property-rights activist Hernando de
Soto, this public television special presents, for the first time, the
basic human and economic events that led to the Arab uprisings in the
Middle East and North Africa. The program shows that “The Arab Spring”
was less a political event than it was about the coming of the
industrial revolution to a region where over 90% of the population lives
and works outside the rule of law. De Soto shows us that this informal
economy is, however, the one common thread that can contribute to the
region’s growth and stability.
Amid provocative images of the Arab uprisings of 2010 and 2011,
De Soto introduces the people and events that recently rocked the Arab
world, sparked by the self-immolation of the poor, 26 year old street
vendor, Tarek Bouazizi. It was not the $225 lost from his fruit cart,
expropriated by the police, that transformed young Bouazizi into a
martyr and a symbol of the revolution — it was his similarity to the
180 million informal Arab entrepreneurs; many of them under 30 and
computer literate. Over 100 of them followed Bouazizi in acts of
self-immolation.
The history of business in the Arab world is highlighted in
sequences from Morocco, and the program demonstrates how business is
thriving along with Arab culture in the international business city of
Istanbul.
Traveling through the region, De Soto summarizes, “Throughout
the Middle East the story is the same. As the industrial revolution
comes to the Middle East, the true path to stability rests in the
region's single common denominator: the informal marketplace. The Arab
consensus ahead is about more than emancipating the entrepreneurial
spirit; it’s about resolving the institutional deficiencies that make
most Arabs desperately poor."