( VIDEO & TRANSCRIPTS ) Nobel Winners Warn of Nuclear Risk on 80th Anniv. of Trinity Test, Release New “Hard Rain” & ( VIDEO & TRANSCRIPT ) OPPENHEIMER: The Decision to Drop the Bomb 16JUL25 & 1965

 ON the 80th anniversary of the Trinity Test, the detonation of the first atomic bomb we should all take time to think about how dangerous the world has become. This from Democracy Now explores the risk the entire planet faces, no matter one's nationality, politics or socio-economic standing, from nuclear weapons. Also from NBC News.....

New Release of Bob Dylan's "Hard Rain" as Nobel Winners Warn of Nuclear Risk on Trinity Test Anniv.

New Release of Bob Dylan’s “Hard Rain” as Nobel Winners Warn of Nuclear Risk on Trinity Test 80th Anniversary

• Nuclear Weapons
• Music
• Art & Politics

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Guests

• Daniel Holz

  professor of physics, astronomy and astrophysics at the University of Chicago, chair of the Science and Security Board of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the founding director of the University of Chicago Existential Risk Laboratory (XLab).
• David Harrington

  violinist, founder and artistic director of the Grammy Award-winning Kronos Quartet.

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Links

• Nobel Laureate Assembly for the Prevention of Nuclear War
• University of Chicago Existential Risk Laboratory (XLab)
• Kronos Quartet

On July 16, 1945, the United States carried out the Trinity test, the world’s first nuclear detonation. Today, 80 years later, the University of Chicago — the site of the first self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction — is host to the Nobel Laureate Assembly for the Prevention of Nuclear War, an event that brings Nobel laureates and nuclear experts together to confront the growing global risk of nuclear war. The event features a performance by the award-winning string ensemble Kronos Quartet, who have spearheaded two new renditions of Bob Dylan’s “A Hard Rain’s A-Gonna Fall” featuring nearly 50 more artists from around the world. Titled “Hard Rain” and “Hard Rain (Drone),” the new pieces aim to raise awareness of the ongoing threat of nuclear war.

As the global political situation becomes increasingly unstable, says professor Daniel Holz, chair of the Science and Security Board of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and one of the organizers of the assembly, “the likelihood that we’ll sort of stumble into a nuclear war and the end of civilization … has gone way up.” Holz joins Democracy Now! alongside violinist, artistic director and founder of the Kronos Quartet, David Harrington, to share what inspired them to commission and create “Hard Rain,” which debuts today. “We need everyone in the world to know how dangerous and how awful this is for all of us. And if music and musicians can step up and project those kinds of concerns about all of our futures, then music is doing its job,” says Harrington.

Transcript

This is a rush transcript. Copy may not be in its final form.

AMY GOODMAN: This is Democracy Now!, democracynow.org, The War and Peace Report. I’m Amy Goodman, with Juan González.

Eighty years ago today, July 16, 1945, in the desert of New Mexico, in a place called Alamogordo, the U.S. carried out the world’s first nuclear detonation. Three weeks later, the U.S. would go on to drop atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, killing at least an estimated 120,000 people.

The atomic bombs were developed by the secret U.S. government research program called the Manhattan Project. This is J. Robert Oppenheimer, head of the Manhattan Project, sharing his response to that first nuclear explosion in New Mexico 80 years ago today. He spoke in a rarely seen NBC News documentary produced nearly two decades later.

J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER: We knew the world would not be the same. A few people laughed. A few people cried. Most people were silent. I remembered the line from the Hindu scripture, the Bhagavad Gita. Vishnu is trying to persuade the prince that he should do his duty, and, to impress him, takes on his multi-armed form and says, “Now I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds.” I suppose we all thought that, one way or another.

AMY GOODMAN: Scientist J. Robert Oppenheimer responding to the first nuclear test 80 years ago today.

Three years before that, in 1942, the University of Chicago was the site of the historic first self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction, a key step in the path to creating a nuclear weapon. University of Chicago would go on to host the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, which was formed by scientists from the Manhattan Project who were worried about the risks to civilization from nuclear weapons. The group now sets the Doomsday Clock each year as a metaphor for how close humanity is to destruction.

Well, today, there’s a gathering at the University of Chicago to confront the crisis of the increasing risk of nuclear war, called the Nobel Laureate Assembly for the Prevention of Nuclear War, that’s bringing together Nobel Prize-winning scientists, peace activists and musicians. It will culminate with a performance by the Grammy Award-winning Kronos Quartet and the release of two renditions of literature Nobel Laureate Bob Dylan’s “A Hard Rain’s A-Gonna Fall” that feature the band, the quartet, playing with nearly 50 artists from around the world. This is an excerpt.

KRONOS QUARTET & THE HARD RAIN COLLECTIVE: Where hunger is ugly, where the souls are forgotten
Where black is the color, where none is the number
And I’ll tell it and speak it and think it and breathe it
And reflect from the mountain so all souls can see it
Then I’ll stand on the ocean until I start sinkin’
And I’ll know my song well before I start singin’

And it’s a hard, it’s a hard, it’s a hard, it’s a hard
It’s a hard rain’s a-gonna fall
And it’s a hard, it’s a hard, it’s a hard, it’s a hard
It’s a hard rain’s a-gonna fall

AMY GOODMAN: Bob Dylan’s “Hard Rain,” Kronos Quartet and The Hard Rain Collective. It includes Ringo Starr, Iggy Pop, Allison Russell, Willie Nelson, Laurie Anderson and so many dozens of other musicians.

To talk more about how the Nobel Prize team and the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists reached out to the Kronos Quartet with the idea for this project and about this Nobel Laureate Assembly for the Prevention of Nuclear War, we’re joined by David Harrington, violinist, founder and artistic director of the Kronos Quartet, which has focused for over half a century on the intersection of music and activism. Also with us, Daniel Holz, professor of physics, astronomy and astrophysics at the University of Chicago, chair of the Science and Security Board of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Professor Holz is also founding director of the University of Chicago Existential Risk Laboratory. He’s a co-organizer of the Nobel Laureate Assembly for the Prevention of Nuclear War underway today.

We welcome you both to Democracy Now! Let’s start with Professor Holz. The significance of this day, first, you know, of course, the assembly at the University of Chicago, but what happened 80 years ago and why that is so significant, in the desert of New Mexico?

DANIEL HOLZ: Yeah, so, first, thanks for having me here and for discussing this on such an important day, the 80th anniversary of Trinity.

Trinity was sort of the birth of a new age, the age of nuclear weapons, and we’re still in that age. And the threats that people recognize, that Oppenheimer’s quote that you just played kind of captures, they’re still with us. We now have thousands of these weapons. They’re on high alert. They can go off at any moment. Within an hour, civilization could end. That’s still where we are now.

And so, given that, there’s a sense of urgency that that we need to kind of step back from this brink, as what’s sort of hard to understand is, here we are, 80 years later, and it’s ever more dangerous, that these weapons are still there, threatening us. And so, this whole thing is about trying to find a way to kind of move back away from the possibility of nuclear annihilation.

JUAN GONZÁLEZ: And, Professor Holz, especially now, what’s your sense of what our political leaders have learned over these many decades in terms of nuclear weapons? Of course, we have a president now who, in his first term, withdrew the United States from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal, and then, of course, has been risking, with his attacks on Iran, greater problems in terms of the threats of a possible nuclear war to Iran. Could you talk about what our leaders are learning or have learned?

DANIEL HOLZ: Yeah, so, that’s a very important point, which is — and I think all of your audience knows this — the world is becoming much more unstable. There’s a sense that things are deteriorating globally, in many different avenues. And that makes nuclear exchange, nuclear war much more likely. And while this is happening, the awareness of the nuclear threat is decreasing. There are so many things to be distracted by that there’s a tendency for people to focus on other, you know, very significant threats, such as climate change or AI or pandemics, but the nuclear threat is still with us and growing. And I would say, probably since the end of the Cold War, it’s fallen off the radar both of the public and of leadership. And that combination of the risks increasing, the world becoming more unstable and attention to this issue decreasing is particularly alarming, because it means the likelihood that we’ll sort of stumble into a nuclear war and the end of civilization, that that could happen by mistake or miscalculation, has gone way up in the past years, to the point where we’re so alarmed that we’re doing everything we can to kind of draw attention to this risk and try to find ways to mitigate it.

And that’s the whole point of this Nobel laureate assembly. We’re bringing together Nobel laureates and nuclear experts and trying to find a way forward, a way to reduce the risk, get the messages out to the public and also to leaders that here are steps that can be taken to reduce this. We need to get the awareness back, and we need to do everything we can to prevent the sort of nuclear annihilation that would impact literally everyone on the planet. It’s in all of our interests to find a way to reduce these risks and these threats.

AMY GOODMAN: David Harrington, I’d like to bring you into this conversation, founder of the remarkable Kronos Quartet, violinist yourself. If you can talk about this musical collaboration, everyone from Ringo Starr to Willie Nelson to Allison Russell to your own Kronos Quartet? And people may forget the Nobel Laureate Bob Dylan — Patti Smith went to receive the award for him years ago. So, what — why did you choose “Hard Rain”? Talk about the significance back in 1962 of Bob Dylan’s hit.

DAVID HARRINGTON: You know, it’s remarkable that a 21-year-old singer-songwriter wrote this song in 1962 and how — when you observe and know the words of this song very clearly, how important it is to our time right now. And so, when Owen Gaffney from the Nobel Committee asked if Kronos would be interested in reimagining the song, it took me a tenth of a second to say yes.

I didn’t know how much would be involved in doing what we ended up doing, which is probably a good thing, because we had to do this, you know, on tour. We had to do it — to make what we wanted, we needed the whole music community. And we got it. And so, with Elia Einhorn, master producer, we were able to assemble, I think, musicians that represent humanity, in a way that I’m so proud that the music community stepped up. And we get to play tonight. In fact, we’re closing the assembly.

DANIEL HOLZ: That’s right.

DAVID HARRINGTON: And, you know, for music to be in that position, I think, is a good thing. And I’m so happy to be a part of this. And Daniel is such a leader in our world. And for me, this is something I’ve wanted Kronos to be a part of for 52 years, and today we are. And I’m very, very happy about that.

JUAN GONZÁLEZ: And, David Harrington, this cooperation between music and also the scientists involved in this assembly, is it your hope to break through what Daniel Holz is talking about, the lack of attention by the general public to the dangers of nuclear war?

DAVID HARRINGTON: Yes, and the fact that there are very few survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki alive right now, and so the people that know absolutely what it’s like to be bombed and be in a nuclear explosion. I think we’re forgetting that this actually happened. And so we need those testimonies, and we need everyone in the world to know how dangerous and how awful this is for all of us. And if music and musicians can step up and project those kinds of concerns about all of our futures, then music is doing its job. And what we need to do as musicians is listen. And when I listen to what’s happening in the world, it’s terrifying, and I want my musical community to do something about it. And this is our first step.

AMY GOODMAN: Well, I want to thank you so much. You were just going to say something, Professor Holz? And then we’re going to wrap up.

DANIEL HOLZ: Yeah, yeah, I was just going to say, I mean, it is so important, because this brings the public into this, the kind of enthusiasm for this. But it also is part of what makes us all hopeful. It’s very inspirational. You listen to the music, you’re kind of captivated. It’s part of, you know, the glory of humanity. It’s what we want to preserve. It’s what we’re all working for. And so, this combination, this way to end the assembly, where we’re spending three days focused on all the bad stuff, all the ways things can go wrong, but also focus on all the opportunities to change course to make things better, the perfect way to end is with the Kronos. So we’re just so excited and honored.

DAVID HARRINGTON: Thank you.

AMY GOODMAN: And how do people, David, have access to this song, “Hard Rain,” written in 1962 right around the time of the Cuban missile crisis?

DAVID HARRINGTON: Yes. Yeah, it came out — this recording came out in its two forms this morning, and it’s released by Red Hot. And I invite everyone to check it out. Turn it up loud, and play it proud.

AMY GOODMAN: Well, I want to thank you both for being with us. We will link to it at democracynow.org. I want to thank David Harrington, who is the violinist and founder, artistic director of the Kronos Quartet, part of The Hard Rain Collective, and professor Daniel Holz, a physicist, a professor of astronomy, astrophysics and physics at the University of Chicago, chair of the Science and Security Board of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, co-organizer of the Nobel Laureate Assembly for the Prevention of Nuclear War that’s underway today at the University of Chicago.

OPPENHEIMER: The Decision to Drop the Bomb (1965)

J Robert Oppenheimer and other key figures involved in the decision to drop the first atomic bomb discuss their motivations in this rare NBC News documentary. Originally produced two decades after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, this presentation features new insight from NBC News Presidential Historian Michael Beschloss.

OPPENHEIMER: THE DECISION TO DROP THE BOMB

TRANSCRIPT

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foreign [Music]

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to this age no one can argue this is the nuclear age

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of the always present threat of instant total annihilation

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we get here how did it all begin

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it was born in another time in a world like this

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1945

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Wars had always been till 8 15 on the morning of August 6

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1945 when a single plane carrying a carrying a song opened the age we now live in

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the decision to drop an atomic bomb on the city of Hiroshima was perhaps the most important decision of our time

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the controversy at Stern has gone on with Rising intensity ever since how was the decision made why was it

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made could the instant destruction of Hiroshima of 70 000 Japanese men women

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and children have been avoided in the spring of 1945 it was known that

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an atomic bomb would be made all that remained was to decide whether and how to use it

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this is the story of the 135 days of that decision the first day April 12 1945

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we interrupt this program with a special bulletin a press Association has announced that President Roosevelt is

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dead the president died of a cerebral hemorrhage all we know is that the president died in Warm Springs Georgia

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he has been president for 12 years longer than any other man he is the only President many have known

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now on this April afternoon with the United States at War around the world he

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is suddenly gone now someone else must make the life and death decisions

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the vice president is almost unknown he has been in office less than three months obscured by the dominating figure

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of the president now he is President The Leader by chance of the greatest military Coalition in

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history at 709 PM Harry S Truman takes the oath of office he never wanted to hold

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assumes the responsibilities for which he has had no time to be prepared or briefed

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he says the moon the stars and all the planets just fell on me he says pray for

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me he tells his cabinet no one can fill the void that has been left he says he will

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try to carry on Roosevelt's policies when the cabinet leaves one man stays

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behind 78 year old Secretary of War Henry L Simpson weary but iron willed with a

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secret he must now tell the new president

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a moment is described by his friend and biographer McGeorge Bundy Truman tells of that conversation in

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this language Stimson told me he wanted me to know about an important project that was

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underway a project looking to the development of a new explosive of almost

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unbelievable destructive power that was all he felt free to say and his

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statement left me puzzled it was the first information that had come to me about the atomic bomb

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but he gave me no details the Pentagon the project to build the atomic bomb has

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been given the code name Manhattan District it is being built under the direction of a recently promoted

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Brigadier General of the Corps of Engineers his name is Leslie Groves he

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reports only to Army Chief of Staff George Marshall Secretary of War Stimson and the president

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a few doors away the future strategy of the war is being planned

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few of the planners have been told the secret of the bomb Secretary of State statinius and the men

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in the state department planning the post-war policy of the United States do not know the secret

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on Capitol Hill congressmen who have appropriated two billion dollars for the Manhattan

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District do not know on what the money is being spent in Laboratories around the country there

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are men who know the secret the scientists are deeply worried by the implications of the force they are about

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to let loose on the world one is Leo zillard who urged Einstein to

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tell Roosevelt that the United States ought to try to make an atomic bomb he recorded his views about the bomb

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before he died they are read by his wife and this is what he said

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in the spring of 45 it was clear that the war against Germany would soon end

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and so I began to ask myself what is the purpose of continuing the development of the bomb

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how would the bomb be used by the time be home

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initially we were strongly motivated to produce a bomb because we feared the Germans would get ahead of us and the

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only way to prevent them from dropping bombs on us was to have bombs in Readiness ourselves

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but now with the war one it was not clear what we were working for and because of Seacoast say there was no

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intermediate level in the government to which we could have gone for a careful consideration of these issues

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the only man with whom we were sure we were entitled to communicate was the president

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I knew any number of people who could have reached Roosevelt but I know nobody offhand who could have

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reach torment Truman just did not move in the same service as Harry Truman comes to speak for the

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first time to a joint session of Congress he has much on his mind that takes priority over the atomic bomb

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he is still forming his administration he is still learning his job pressing

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problems around the world demand his attention foremost among these is the global war

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the United States is fighting I call upon all Americans to help me keep our

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nation United in defense of those ideals which have been so eloquently proclaimed

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by Franklin Roosevelt our demand has been and it remains

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unconditional surrender for the next 11 days the president has

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no time to think about a secret weapon that may or may not work

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as he speaks three million American GIS are in Europe fighting their way across Germany

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and Beyond the strategy of the war lies the problem of what to do with Germany after the war how to restore Europe how to deal with

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the Soviet Union

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on the other side of the world in the Pacific on the islands and coral atolls

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the Japanese are resisting fanatically toll of United States dead and wounded

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on the beaches in the jungles is rising

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oh

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at this moment far from the War hidden in the hills of East Tennessee at a place not even on a map called Oak Ridge

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under rigid security restrictions is a plant that uses twice as much electricity as the city of Memphis

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uses huge amounts of raw material has cost almost a billion dollars but

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does not seem to produce anything

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the fact is behind the wall of security slowly painfully Oak Ridge is

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manufacturing uranium-235 the explosive material for the atomic

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Palm April 25 1945.

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as the conference to organize the United Nations begins State Department policy planners still have not been told about

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the bomb the president still has not been briefed worried by this Secretary of War Stimson

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arranges to see the president Mr Simpson took with him to that meeting memorandum which he kept among his

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records and which tells very clearly the way in which he then saw the matter

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he pointed out that while the United States was ahead in developing a weapon it would not remain ahead indefinitely

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certainly would not preserve a monopoly forever and that the nation which would catch up first would be the Soviet Union

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pointed out that the weapon and its use were not merely an immediate military question

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but a political question since this new Force threatened the very existence of

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civilization will secretary Stimson is General Groves

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Mr Truman did not like to read long reports and this report was not wrong

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considering the size the project is about 24 pages and uh he would uh constantly interrupt

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his reading to say well I don't like to read papers and Mr Stimson would reply well we can't tell you this in any more

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concise language this is a big project the president indicated his feeling that

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it was sound and that there was no reason to make any changes in our course of action

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the three Begins the Red Army is advancing speed by street through the burning ruins of Berlin

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the Nazis announced Hitler is dead the war in Europe is ending but even as the

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last bitter battle is being fought the problems of post-war Europe the war in the Pacific now begin to occupy the

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minds of the political leaders Stimson again meets in secret with the

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president his then assistant John McCloy describes

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his State of Mind of course he was greatly involved in the mechanical production of the bomb the

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physical problems that were connected with that but I think more deeply than that he was also involved with the heavy

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responsibilities and the heavy imponderables that were related to the bomb in its use the secretary

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recommended the establishment of a special committee called the interim committee to consider all aspects of the

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matter and in particular the immediate and pressing question of the relation of

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this new weapon to the war against Japan

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the membership had been worked on until we got what we thought would be a very

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fine committee uh and we even went so far as to uh say

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that of course the President should be allowed to if he wanted to to pick a man

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for it and of course he could upset and pick all of his own people but

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he even picked the man that we wanted on there who was Mr Burns

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James F Burns former Supreme Court Justice former rival to Harry Truman for

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the vice presidency soon to become his secretary of state and his most influential advisor

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as Simpson sees the president at the Pentagon General Groves meets with General Marshall

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I thought it was time to start the planning for the actual military operation

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he uh I said that I thought that I would like to have him designate two officers

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in the Operations Division of the general staff that I could talk to and

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get them started on making their plans uh very much to my surprise General

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Marshall said after a moment's thought he said is

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there any reason why you can't do that yourself my reply was no sir and those were the

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instructions I had and the only instructions I had about formulating the war plans

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I then talked to General Arnold the chief of Air Force about it told him that I wanted to

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some advice from some of his officers General norstott who was then the chief

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of staff of the 20th Air Force which was a big bombing command under the direct

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control of General Arnold and was assigned to assist me in that way

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uh I appointed a Target committee uh

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to survey the field so that we would have the right Targets in Japan

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and so that everything would be ready at the time that we needed to be ready

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May 8th in Europe after four and a half years of war 20 million dead Germany

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surrenders unconditionally will the same bloody battles have to be repeated across the Japanese home

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Islands this is the question United States military planners must now answer

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as they Ponder this b-29s take off from a remote Airfield in the Utah desert

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on board are pick Crews part of a secret air unit designated the 509th composite

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group they have not been told what their mission is day after day they practice learning to

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drop a bomb

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May 9 1945 the war in Europe is over the

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nations of Europe lie in Ruins thousands are hungry without clothes homeless

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the United States and the Soviet Union begin to quarrel over the future of Germany and Eastern Europe

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Winston Churchill urges a big three meeting before United States troops are sent to the Pacific

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Washington in answer to Churchill the president tentatively agrees to a

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July 1st meeting secretary Stimson urges delay

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his diary puts it this way uh the president has promised to meet Stalin and Churchill the first of July

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and at that time these questions will become burning it may be necessary to have it out with Russia on her relations

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to Manchuria Port Arthur and other ports of North China over any such Tangled weave of problems

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this secret would be dominant and yet there was a problem as the diary

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entry goes on to say in the fact that we would not know by the 1st of July in all probability

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whether or not uh the weapon was in fact a success

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the secretary noted that it seemed a terrible thing to gamble with such big stakes in

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diplomacy without having your master plan in your hand

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May 9 the first meeting of the interim committee Stimson is Chairman George Harrison his

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Deputy Gordon arneson recording secretary some of the members had not heard of

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this project a Manhattan District they knew nothing about the development of

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the atomic bomb so much of the meeting was devoted to a

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technical briefing which was conducted by Mr Harrison and by General Groves

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another question that came up this meeting was how long would it take the Soviet Union

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to produce an atomic weapon estimates ranged from three to four

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years as suggested by Dr Bush Dr Conant to 20 years as suggested by General

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Groves Mr Burns felt that this point was a very important one

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it would have a very important bearing on on how we dealt with the Soviet Union on this question

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whether to try to bring them in at an early stage whether to

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outrace them just what our posture ought to be later in another conference room

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General Groves meets with his Target committee to discuss their assignment

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of course the target committee was given definite instructions by me as to what

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we wanted we wanted for example the first city uh to be bombed we wanted it to be big

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enough so that the effects of the bomb would run out that it wouldn't be a

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small spot out in a desert that you wouldn't know what the effect would be

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May 25 The Joint Chiefs meet to talk about plans for the war against Japan

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the next step to be taken after the Okinawa campaign the Navy Advocates blockading Japan

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invading the China Coast the Air Force wants to force Japan to

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surrender with its fire raids General Marshall favors invasion of the

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Japanese home Islands Admiral Nimitz and general McArthur concur

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Chief of Staff Admiral lay agrees but he says The Invasion could cost up to a

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million American lives the decision of The Joint Chiefs is to recommend to the president

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operation Olympic against kyoshu in November Coronet against Honshu in the

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spring The Joint Chiefs do not consider the atomic bomb they do not know if it will work or how

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effective it will be meanwhile Japan is being destroyed by

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Conventional Weapons a record 400 b-29s attacked Japan with firebombs

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the Japanese are being burned in their cities from one end of the Homeland to the other

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Behind the Walls of the Imperial Palace the leaders are divided on how to face the looming disaster

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Mark was keto Lauren privy seal adviser to the emperor

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at least one city and at times two was being turned into Ash's deity

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I don't know how many cities there are in Japan but I realized that they would all be

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leveled in time with the winter approaching tens of millions of people would die a dog's

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death from hunger and exposure and I said to them how can we carry on

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the war under such condition secretary to war minister anami

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it was our hope that we would be able to deal a heavy brawl to the American

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Landing forces and this Victory would induce The Americans

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to propose the termination of the war to us we had no delusion that this blow

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could finish off the American strength but we crank to the hope that this would give us a bargaining advantage to ask

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for better turns in the peace treaty cabinet secretary sakumizo

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therefore if anyone ever dared to utter a word about ceasefire or anything like

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that he would be arrested by the military police if he were a government official

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he would have been dismissed from his post so no one could speak out or say

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anything of that sort openly Washington the president delays The Big Three

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meeting this is Simpson's idea he wants to have the bomb ready before the president

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meets Stalin later back of the Pentagon Stimson sends

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for General Groves he asked me uh had I selected the target

21:08

chat I replied yes the targets were I had that report already and I expected to

21:15

take it over to General Marshall the following morning for his uh consideration and approval

21:22

uh Mr stimpson then said well uh your

21:27

report's all finished isn't it I said well I haven't gone over it yet Mr Stimson I want to be sure that I've got

21:33

it just right and he said well he said I'd like to see it and I said well it's across the river

21:38

and it would take a long time to get it he said

21:43

I have all day and I know how fast your office operates there's a phone on this

21:50

desk you pick it up and you call your office have them bring that report over and

21:57

when I protested slightly that I thought that was something that General Marshall

22:02

should pass on first Mr stimpson said this is one time that I'm going to be

22:09

the final deciding Authority nobody's going to tell me what to do on this he

22:15

said on this matter I am the Kingpin and you might just as well

22:21

get that report over here well uh in the meantime he asked me what

22:27

uh cities I was planning on bombing or what targets

22:33

uh I informed him and told him that Kyoto was the preferred Target as the

22:39

first one because it was of such size that we would have no question about the the effects of the bomb

22:46

he immediately said well I don't want Kyoto bomb

22:52

and he went on to tell me about its uh all history is the cultural center of

22:59

Japan the former ancient capital and a great many reasons why he didn't want to

23:05

see it bombed uh when the report came over and I handed

23:11

it to him and he uh he really his mind was made up as soon as he heard the word

23:16

Kyoto there's no question about that after he got the report he read it over then he walked over to the door

23:24

separating his office from General Marshalls opened it and said General Marshall if

23:29

you're not busy I wish you'd come in and then the secretary really double

23:35

crossed me because without any explanation he said to General Marshall uh

23:41

Marshall uh John goes it just brought me his report on the proposed targets he

23:49

says I don't like it Kyoto is removed from the target list the second Target on the list is Hiroshima

23:58

May 31 headlines report for fire raids on Japan have left

24:03

endless [Music]

24:08

the Japanese dead now number in six figures

24:17

Air Force General Lemay says we are driving the Japanese back to the caves

24:24

in this atmosphere the interim committee meets to recommend to the president how to use the atomic bomb

24:32

presiding Henry stemson recording secretary Gordon arneson

24:37

the question arose what should our posture be with regard to the Soviet

24:44

Union Dr Oppenheimer thought that we should

24:49

mention these developments in general terms uh to the Soviet Union

24:56

and hope for subsequent discussions that might lead to cooperation in the

25:01

field head of the scientific panel Robert Oppenheimer Mr stimpson

25:09

was clearly thinking along these lines

25:14

and although General Marshall and general Groves who

25:19

were not members of the committee uh were in one or another sense military

25:25

men and although they they have had

25:30

somewhat different sense of urgency and priority

25:37

um they did not

25:42

at that meeting approach these questions in a way very different than

25:49

that put forward by the panel in this connection uh

25:54

General Marshall did say as a kind of passing thought

26:00

I I don't put it any higher than that that perhaps it would be a good idea to invite the Soviet Union

26:07

to send observers to the tested Alamogordo this suggestion was not taken up by

26:15

anyone else and was quickly passed by Mr Burns felt very strongly at this

26:21

stage that we should not share any information with the Soviet Union nor should we make any immediate

26:28

overtures to them James Burns representing the president on the interim committee

26:34

I cannot speak for the the others but it

26:40

was ever present in in my mind that it was uh

26:46

important that we should have an end to the war

26:53

before the Russians came in the meeting continues behind closed doors

26:58

other points are raised former Harvard president Conant we were

27:04

operating in a climate and our opinion and whichever body almost took for granted a tremendous uh destruction of

27:12

Civilian lives and a civilian dwelling houses and of cities and

27:18

I believe that the horror of the war that was on and the horror of the war

27:24

which military planners expected to continue for a long time was so very

27:30

great that it was more or less taken for granted that if a new weapon could put

27:37

an end to this agony it should be so used any weapon that would be an end to the war and save the

27:46

lives to save a million casualties among American boys was justified

27:53

at lunchtime Mr Burns asked Dr Lawrence

28:00

to raise again the question that had been raised earlier simply in passing

28:05

namely that the weapon should not be used against the Japanese in the war

28:12

but that there should be a striking but harmless demonstration of

28:17

this weapon in the hope that the Japanese might be persuaded

28:23

to sue for peace coupled with this demonstration of

28:29

course was the possibility that the weapon might have to be used subsequently if the Japanese were not

28:36

sufficiently impressed this idea was discussed at some length

28:45

Dr Oppenheimer for example said he doubted whether there could be

28:50

devised any uh sufficiently startling demonstration

28:57

that would convince the Japanese they ought to throw in the sponge remember none of us had then ever seen a

29:04

bombed at all we had no idea as to what you could do uh what sort of effect it

29:09

would have if we were to try a demonstration over a Japanese territory

29:15

the plane might be shot down American prisoners of War might be brought into the demonstration area

29:21

president would have had to take the responsibility of telling the world that we have this atomic bomb and how

29:29

terrific it was that would be the specific declaration

29:36

that uh would have happened to the wall the good Lord only knows

29:43

someone finally said unless these this weapon is used with Maximum Impact it

29:51

may be very difficult for anyone to see much difference between it and the fire bomb raids that

29:57

were going on at that very time over Tokyo

30:02

June 1 the headlines say parade

30:09

[Music] burned out a halt the slaughter

30:21

makes a unanimous recommendation

30:29

to say from our point of view what would have been the consequences if we had advised against the use of this weapon

30:36

because it was so new and was so concentrated in its effect

30:41

and if our advice had been followed by the president who made the final decision what would this mean and from

30:48

our point of view it would have meant continuing the devastation of Japan by conventional methods it would have meant

30:55

so we were led to believe uh the invasion of the of Japan and a

31:02

continuation for months of a terrible War causing not only American casualties but

31:08

enormous loss of life um in the Japanese says wow this would

31:13

have been the consequences I don't say under those conditions uh a person could

31:18

fail to make the decision to use a weapon which we believed would shorten the war

31:24

the recommendation of the interim committee was a recommendation only

31:30

the final responsibility for making a recommendation to the president

31:37

himself rested with the Mr Simpson he never sought to conceal that

31:45

as the committee adjourns one member of a scientific panel has a question Arthur Compton head of Chicago project

31:52

says what shall I tell zillard and the other scientists and he was told that he

31:58

could mention the committee that it was anxious to have the views of scientists

32:03

he asked several groups to prepare papers this took place on the 2nd of June

32:12

among the groups asked to write papers was one which became known as the Frank

32:18

committee the front committee has its report ready

32:23

to go to Washington within a few days one of the signers is Glenn seaborg who

32:30

18 years later will become chairman of the atomic energy Commission some of the main conclusions of that report were

32:37

that the there were no long-lasting secrets of

32:44

nuclear energy of nuclear weapons that other nations would obtain nuclear

32:51

weapons in the not too distant future after the war and therefore

32:56

International control of some kind was imperative but perhaps the conclusion

33:02

that has been most publicized was the suggestion that the nuclear

33:08

weapon not be dropped directly upon Japan but that it be demonstrated first

33:15

on some uninhabited area the report was first was supposed to be taken by

33:20

Compton who will event on a business trip to Washington and Frank was so

33:25

anxious to see that it was really delivered to the as high possible as

33:31

high a person as possible Stimson that he volunteered to a company

33:38

on this trip but November correctly was only an upper birth of available playing

33:44

climbing an upper birth just to bring the report personally to to Washington they came to

33:50

the Pentagon on July and June 12th

33:56

are hoping to see the secretary he was not available Nora was the vice chairman George

34:03

Harrison I received them talked with them about

34:10

the reports received copies of the report as well as

34:16

a letter A covering letter which Dr Compton had written

34:22

he said he thought that these recommendations did not

34:28

take fully enough into consideration the fact that a technical demonstration

34:34

might mean considerable prolongation of the war

34:40

and a second failure to use the weapon in all its Fury might make it very difficult for the

34:47

world to understand what it really was facing and

34:53

not understanding what it was fate might not make the effort that really was needed to see whether we

35:00

could not get effective International control well I I got the report and it the

35:07

Compton letter to Harrison as quickly as he was available

35:14

said well this report really ought to be

35:21

examined and commented upon by the scientific panel

35:27

before the interim committee is asked to express its views

35:32

so he called Dr Compton in Los Alamos

35:38

and said he wanted to know what the scientific panel thought about this proposal

35:43

and that the interim committee intended to hold off discussion of the report until they had the views of the

35:49

scientific panel in hand June 18th

36:02

while crowds cheer the supreme commander of the European War the nation's leaders once again consider the problems of the

36:08

unfinished war in the Pacific as Eisenhower rides down Pennsylvania

36:13

Avenue at the White House a decision is being made secretary Stimson and The Joint Chiefs

36:20

meet with the president they tell him there is no alternative to invading Japan

36:26

they estimate the war will end in the fall 1946. the atomic bomb is mentioned but it has

36:33

not yet been tested no one knows what it will do a delay in The Invasion plans is not

36:39

considered the president agrees he has no alternative he orders The Joint

36:44

Chiefs to go ahead machinery for the first stage of the invasion begins to move

36:50

The Invasion will be here Kyushu D-Day November 1.

36:57

in Japan on a similar map the same problem is being examined by Lieutenant General orisue

37:06

those of us in the second Department the G2 had to consider

37:13

whether the American forces would try to land in the southern Kyushu or on the

37:19

Kanto Plains our conclusion was that if the Americans

37:24

landed on Southern Kyushu our present forces our own would be sufficient to

37:30

fight off the Americans soon as owachi commander of suicide

37:35

Naval forces in Kyushu I deployed my forces around numerous

37:43

points along the coast there were about 600 shinyo typecraft

37:49

under my command and they were posted throughout the coastline

37:55

hidden in small ports and other Vantage points for defense

38:01

Island there were about 100 Titan type human

38:06

Torpedoes primed for Action we were absolutely confident that with these

38:12

forces we could meet and sink at least 200 American transports

38:19

June 21 the interim committee committee panels answer to questions raised by the front report

38:26

I remember that we first responded to the question what the scientists think

38:31

by saying that they think a variety of things that this is only natural this is not

38:39

a completely trivial question we said second that we didn't think that

38:46

we had before us the kind of information or the kind of

38:51

insight or in back of us the kind of experience that really qualified US

38:58

cope with this decision we said that there seemed to be two great views among scientists and no

39:05

doubt would be among others if people knew about it on the one hand

39:10

they hoped that

39:16

this instrument would never be used in war

39:21

and therefore they hope that we would not start out by using it on the other hand

39:28

they hoped or other people hoped that it would put

39:34

an end to this war save countless lives put an end to it

39:40

and boat tray that had been going on for many years and had been marked by

39:49

atrocities concentration camps murderous raids on cities

39:57

Rotterdam and Dresden and Tokyo itself

40:07

and that on the whole you're inclined to think that if

40:14

it was needed to put an end to the war and had a chance of so doing

40:20

we thought that was the right thing to do it is not that we said a test isn't feasible but we said we don't think we

40:28

could recommend one that was likely to induce surrender on hearing this report

40:35

uh from the the panel the interim committee

40:41

decided that they would reaffirm their earlier decision that the

40:48

weapon should be used against the Japanese at the earliest opportunity

40:54

that it would be used without warning and that it should be used against

41:01

a war industry's complex surrounded by homes or other buildings

41:07

most susceptible to damage

41:17

as the interim committee confirms its recommendation to use the atomic bomb on Japan the battle for Okinawa ends in

41:25

three months 98 000 Japanese have died there have been 80 000 American

41:30

casualties

41:39

are being prepared against Japan

41:46

standing by is the mysterious 509th composite group it has no bombs goes on

41:51

no raids the crews do not know the time for its mission is now only six weeks away

41:58

but now in Washington some are reconsidering that mission

42:03

one is under Secretary of the Navy and interim Committee Member Ralph bard

42:10

various people in the armed forces and scientists and various

42:16

people who are close to the picture began to have second thoughts about the

42:23

advisability of

42:28

dropping this bomb without some kind of a warning to the Japanese

42:35

I felt very strongly we should have a specific warning we should tell them

42:41

just what it was that this word Adam Bomb connoted so many things that this

42:46

would be of deep significance it seemed to me not only that it was

42:54

a sin to use a good word

42:59

should be more often used to kill non-combatants but that if such a weapon

43:06

could be made it would be better that'd not be used

43:13

in a war which was ending in order that we might preserve to ourselves

43:20

the knowledge of its construction and its use

43:26

in the event that someday we might need it to preserve

43:31

our government and our safety it was definitely seemed to me that the

43:37

Japanese were ready for surrender they were becoming weaker and weaker

43:43

they were surrounded by the Navy they couldn't get any Imports in and they

43:49

couldn't export anything and naturally as time went on and the

43:54

War developed in our favor quite logical to Hope and expect

44:01

that with the proper kind of a warning that the Japanese would have

44:08

would have made peace bar it was troubled by the

44:13

decision and he still hoped that it might be possible to

44:18

work out some sort of technical demonstration

44:24

that it was worth a try that it might just work and he hoped that might be the decision

44:31

Harrison received this memorandum and duly passed it on to the

44:39

Secretary of War I think primarily to let the secretary

44:45

know that The View was no line no longer unanimous in Los Alamos New Mexico among the

44:53

scientists who will assemble the bomb it is not unanimous either Dr Edward Teller

44:59

from Chicago for my good friend Leo

45:06

he wrote to me about the fan committee

45:13

about the suggestion not to use

45:20

the nuclear bomb on Japan without a previous test

45:28

sillard very often caused me to think about things

45:34

seriously I did not always agree with you

45:39

but on this occasion I felt that he was right a number of people

45:46

um began arguing that we should not use the bomb militarily because Germany was

45:53

obviously collapsing and the Japanese were suffering many reverses and so

45:59

there was a great deal of discussion within the laboratory about on wisdom of

46:06

using the bombs militarily and some people suggest that we drop a bomb uh somewhere not far from Tokyo and the

46:13

Tokyo bay and some others suggests that we drop them over Mount Fujiyama just to

46:19

scare the Japanese you ask yourself would the Japanese government is then constituted with the

46:26

bitter division between the the peace party and the war party would

46:33

it have been influenced by an enormous nuclear firecracker detonated at Great

46:40

height doing little damage

46:46

and your answer is as good as mine I don't know Dr Teller says Dr Oppenheimer spoke to

46:53

him about his protest he told me not to do anything

46:59

he told me that silhouette was using the influence

47:05

of a scientist in an improper way that me the Earth nor I

47:12

nor the majority of the people at Los Angeles [Music]

47:18

and sufficient information to make a decision or to influence a

47:26

decision because we certainly could not have made it to influence a decision in such a weighty manner and the story

47:34

was that he had seen Military Intelligence estimates

47:39

on the course of war in Japan prepared of course without knowledge of

47:45

the atomic bomb and that these estimates were that the Japanese were quite

47:51

unready to surrender that they would continue waging the war even though

47:57

realizing its eventual outcome until where after we invaded the main islands

48:03

of Japan in November and that probably a million casualties

48:08

would result I know only that I was told that an invasion was planned that it

48:15

would be necessary and that it would be terribly costly and it is this

48:20

information which opmahama told us and it certainly had some effect on me and I

48:26

began to think that maybe under these conditions such an in enormously drastic step

48:34

as a military use of the bomb would be justified to reduce the total number of

48:40

casualties and end the war much sooner

48:46

July 8th one by the cruiser Augusta on route to The Big Three meeting the

48:51

president now knows the bomb test is scheduled for July 15.

48:59

now the wedding begins Japan is in ashes the situation is

49:06

growing more desperate every day but the Army and the foreign office still quarrel over what to do

49:16

the Army agrees to seek peace but only if the Soviet Union is mediated

49:24

was opposed to having the Soviet Union act as a mediator

49:29

but the Army was adamant in asking the Soviet Union to mediate

49:34

Mr Togo's view was that it would be totally ineffective to rely on the

49:40

Soviet Union as a mediator however the Army rebutted this argument

49:45

by saying that if the Soviet Union were to become the mediator that would automatically prevent her

49:53

from entering the war and suddenly invading Manchuria

49:58

in Moscow Ambassador Sato is instructed to see Stalin has fallen has promised to

50:04

enter the war against Japan in return for concessions in Manchuria he does not see subtle

50:11

he leaves for the big three meeting in Potsdam instead the Japanese effort to get

50:18

Stalin to intercede is known the Japanese diplomatic code has been broken

50:23

the president knows of the division among the Japanese leaders

50:30

Alamogordo New Mexico at the bomb test site the scientists are working under growing pressure

50:36

they are told there must be no further delays

50:41

the president must know the results of the test when he meets with Stalin meanwhile in Chicago Leo zillard tries

50:49

once again to influence the decision Dr zillard at Chicago

50:57

circulated a petition on which he had some 60 odd signatures

51:04

which again hoped that the weapon would not be used militarily against the

51:10

Japanese that there would be a demonstration

51:15

that maybe the weapon would have to be used if the demonstration didn't work

51:20

but in any event the the decision should be taken in full awareness of the moral

51:26

responsibilities that were involved

51:31

this petition uh generated counter petitions

51:38

they were difficult to judge by these petitions just what the scientists did think

51:44

as a result General grows asked Arthur Compton to conduct an opinion of Paul

51:50

how the Chicago scientists to determine just what was the range of thinking and

51:57

who favored what this opinion poll covered the whole range from no use

52:05

to military use most effective to achieve an early surrender with a

52:10

minimum loss of American lives the sign of this says Chicago are polled individually

52:17

there is no discussion afterwards no one can agree on what they have said

52:23

there's been some controversy about that poll well the questions were quite clear or not

52:30

but Dr Compton felt that 46 percent of those

52:36

polled of I think about 150 uh

52:41

felt that the weapon should be used militarily zillard and the others disagree

52:49

but by the time the pole reaches the Pentagon it is too late how it is interpreted no longer makes

52:56

any difference the Compton poll

53:03

arrived in Washington on the 1st of August

53:10

and I think it would be only Frank to say that that time

53:15

as far as my impression was that as far as secretary Stimson was concerned

53:22

the issue had been decided and there was no further need for

53:28

expressions of opinion from the scientists in Chicago or anywhere else

53:35

in mid-july a car arrives at the test site in the back seat is the plutonium

53:40

for the bomb the man who receives it is General Groves Deputy General Farrell

53:47

on Friday the 13th the active material which when is the bomb

53:55

was ready I signed a receipt for it in order to get off the current Belly of

54:00

the scientists who had when I did so I took it in my hands

54:07

I felt the glowing warmth of this material

54:12

for the worst time I began to sense that maybe there was something to this business as important just about a whole

54:18

week that there was some possibility of a latent energy in this material

54:25

it is 48 hours before HR at Ground Zero

54:34

Monday July 15 1945 Alamogordo New Mexico

54:40

it is D minus one for the test of the world's first atomic device

54:45

the plutonium arrives at the taller on which the device has been placed

54:56

it'll be hoisted to the top where General Farrell and others wait there was a delay in the insertion of

55:04

the ball of active material into a cylindrical hole in the bomb

55:11

it just stuck and wouldn't go in Dr Parker who's in charge of the assembly

55:17

said don't leave it alone it'll it'll get warm and go in as a matter of fact this warmth

55:23

generated in the active material heated the tube it expanded enough so

55:31

went in slipped in the tight fed and then

55:36

the bomb was covered by a canvas tarpaulin and everybody came back to

55:42

Camp to let the rest for a while but when General goves heard about it he

55:48

hit the roof and announced that this was too dangerous it could be sabotage or something and

55:57

that somebody had to watch the bomb until very shortly before the explosion and so three people were selected

56:04

to do it Bainbridge was in charge of the test

56:09

site myself because I had a major role in the bomb assembly

56:17

and Captain in charge of the military police

56:25

guarding the site and so we drove to the tower holding the

56:31

bomb and I climbed halfway up on the platform

56:36

and sat there with big Searchlight watching for girls saboteurs the

56:43

fortunate he never came and uh Bean Bridge was down on the ground

56:50

with a telephone in his hands ready to alert other people if somebody were

56:57

approaching the power and finally Captain McKibbon stood there

57:04

with a machine gun to defend us if necessary in the bunkers the scientists and the

57:11

generals wait no one is quite sure that the two billion dollar device they call the

57:17

gadget will work for a hundred things that could be done wrong any one of which as far as we knew

57:24

we knew pretty much could make the test a failure not because there was anything

57:30

in principle wrong but because we had muffed one of the many complicated pieces of Machinery which we

57:37

were using the weather was not good we

57:43

wanted a definite win Direction so that if we had a cloud of radioactive

57:49

material as we expected that it would not pass over any uh city

57:55

of any size and this meant that it had to be sort of guided

58:00

of course it went in a straight line so you had to figure out just where that

58:05

wind was our worst problem uh was Amarillo and we did not want any Cloud

58:12

to get over Amarillo and then have a rainstorm bring the radioactive material

58:17

down the weather is checked preparations continue the scientists make up a pool

58:23

on the power of the device Fermi suggests it may blow up New Mexico

58:29

as the waiting goes on the tension increases it was a situation where I did not want

58:35

Dr Oppenheimer to get nervous uh we

58:41

at a reasonable hour or something like 9 30 I told him that he should go to bed

58:46

and be called at 12. I said he said well you can't sleep can you I said why yes

58:52

I'm going over here and Dr Bush and Conant going with me and we'll go to sleep in a tent over here I hadn't slept

59:00

for quite a while and I saw a tent with a continent so I rolled in to get a little bit of sleep if possible and the

59:08

wind blew the tent over and the rain soaked me somewhat but everyone else around was pretty well soaked too so it

59:15

didn't make much difference I remember the floor was covered with mud puddles and a couple of people were

59:20

lying down sound asleep on the floor in the water in the mud someone else had curled up on one of the

59:28

bench tops between the oscillographs was trying to catch a cat nap

59:33

and in general there was none of the electric excitement you might have expected at this time it was just an era

59:40

of total weariness while people waited certain observations couldn't be made and there was even some danger of

59:47

Fallout going the wrong places but finally because of the enormous

59:52

political pressure to make the test while the uh Potsdam Conference

1:00:00

of President Truman and Churchill and Stalin was still on progress

1:00:08

Oppenheimer decided to make the test early in the morning

1:00:16

45 a.m Jack Herbert gave me his weather report showing wind

1:00:22

directions and velocities at all levels up to about thirty thousand feet

1:00:29

uh this looks good as far as the safety of the people in the observation portion

1:00:35

in the main camp uh there were a few uh clouds

1:00:42

but this was going to improve with time so the 445 decided to

1:00:48

go ahead with the test East switch was under lock and key and bean which was the only man who had a key the first

1:00:55

switch was right under the tower he opened the box my Cuban and I watched him as he closed

1:01:02

the switch the box was locked not that I distrusted anybody

1:01:08

but I felt more comfortable having those switches locked and

1:01:14

the switches were closed by Kevin at 5 10 and the countdown began

1:01:21

General Farrell says there was in everyone's mind a measure of doubt we

1:01:26

were reaching to the unknown we did not know but might come of it the sequence

1:01:32

of events was all controlled by an automatic timer except sir I have one nice switch

1:01:39

mechanical switch which could stop the test at any moment up until the actual

1:01:45

firing at any moment that I could still react at least if any of the meters and gauges indicated that there

1:01:52

was anything wrong with the test because of course it was terribly important preservatively Brown for a second

1:01:58

attempt if anything should go wrong back at the base camp about five minutes two or three minutes

1:02:05

before the explosion uh we all uh got on the ground face down

1:02:12

away with our feet towards the explosion and the orders issued were that nobody

1:02:17

should should turn to look at the explosion at the countdown until they saw the light

1:02:26

another switch was closed by McKibben at 45 seconds before the Zero Hour

1:02:33

and at that time Don hornig took over the stop switch

1:02:39

I kept on telling myself that if there's a slightest flicker of the needle I must

1:02:44

throw my switch my reaction time's about a half a second I can't take away my attention for even a fraction of a

1:02:51

second and so my eyes were glued and my hands were only switched

1:02:56

and then I could hear the timer counting three two one

1:03:06

an incredible flash of flash eliminated everything many many times by each other

1:03:12

the sunlight doors in New Mexico in the at home on a bright day many miles of

1:03:17

the desert were completely blind you can fall I actually lost my vision for a few seconds when it

1:03:26

recovered I turned back and I saw a huge ball of fire bright

1:03:32

yellow rice through the atmosphere the full

1:03:39

atmosphere in the direction of the bomb was filled with strange violet light

1:03:47

it was one of the most aesthetically beautiful things I've ever seen on an

1:03:53

enormous scale This Cloud was peach pink and purple and just tremendous Bellows

1:04:00

like tremendous smoke cloud and colors would unfold from the interior I mean it

1:04:06

would darken in places and then would open a new burst of luminous gas would come to the surface so I think at that

1:04:13

time I just stood and watched and just just completely enraptured we knew the world would not be the same

1:04:23

few people laughed a few people cried

1:04:29

most people were silent I remembered the line from the Hindu

1:04:38

scripture the bhagavad-gita Vishnu

1:04:46

is trying to persuade the prince that he should do his duty

1:04:52

and to impress him takes on his multi-armed form

1:04:59

and says now I am become death the destroyer of worlds

1:05:08

I suppose we all thought that one way or another and then the feeling which I think was

1:05:14

knowing it to everyone that time when I shook hands with Oppenheimer I said now we're all sons of

1:05:20

foreign

1:05:26

[Music]

1:05:35

test the scientists find the desert at Ground Zero turned glass

1:05:40

the Earth lowered nine feet General Grove's message to the American

1:05:46

leaders meeting at Potsdam with Stalin and Churchill is sent in code just to the effect that the baby had

1:05:53

been born that the dock that the doctor and I think they even said Dr Groves was very

1:06:01

much pleased and that he's a very Lusty infant that his cries could be heard and then

1:06:09

they gave the name of Mr Harrison's country home in Virginia it Warren near

1:06:15

Warrenton and his The Flash in his eyes can be seen and then they gave the

1:06:21

Country Place of Mr stimpson up on Long Island it was the news we had been expecting

1:06:28

day after day and it gave us a feeling of a of confidence to

1:06:38

to defend ourselves in the future bringing into the war

1:06:44

desired by all man we didn't have any celebration but we uh

1:06:51

there isn't any question of the great relief that

1:06:56

we had at 5 10 on the afternoon of July 16 1945 at the Sicilian horse Palace the

1:07:04

meeting of the big three begins Stalin says the Russians will enter the war against Japan by August 8.

1:07:12

he does not know is not told about the new card the president now holds

1:07:17

in public The Big Three are cordial in private friction increases

1:07:23

they bicker over the boundaries of Poland over Eastern Europe over Germany wartime Alliance is breaking up

1:07:31

on the other side of the world unnoticed in the fury of the fire Reigns a single B-29 of the 509th composite group makes

1:07:39

daily sorties over Japan the

1:07:47

bombs that they would carry on these missions were the same size the same weight in the same shape as the atomic

1:07:53

bomb they would fly information under conditions that were here we could

1:07:59

foresee them exactly like for the conditions that they would be encountering when they dropped an atomic

1:08:04

bomb I punched on in the moments before he

1:08:10

must approve the final order the president once again goes over the Alternatives with his advisors

1:08:18

Secretary of War Stimson in order to win the war in the shortest

1:08:23

possible time and to avoid the enormous losses of Life which otherwise confronted us

1:08:29

I felt that we must use the Emperor as our instrument to command and compel his people to

1:08:36

cease fighting and that to accomplish this we must give him and his controlling advisors a

1:08:44

compelling reason to accede to our demands the bombs seemed to me to furnish a

1:08:51

unique instrument for that purpose and it was uh it was important

1:08:57

to bring about an end to the war in a possible to do that before Russia came into the

1:09:05

war it would have come out sooner or later in a congressional hearing if nowhere else just when we could have

1:09:12

dropped the bomb if we didn't use it and then knowing American politics you

1:09:19

know as well as I do that there'd been an election spot on the basis that every

1:09:25

mother whose son was killed after such and such a date uh the blood is on the head of the

1:09:32

president that question was what do we want to save our people and Japanese as well and

1:09:40

when the war or whether we want to take a chance on being able to win the war by

1:09:47

killing all our young men Mr Truman told me that he had been given serious

1:09:52

thought to the subject for many days he was just as reluctant as a man could

1:09:58

be to uh decide and I say for him to decide because it

1:10:07

was his decision final decision was dressed with him it was an awesome responsibility for him

1:10:13

but he could see no alternative and agree three b-29s arrive at Kenyan from the

1:10:21

United States bringing the last components of the bomb to the 509th

1:10:26

the 509th is now ready for its mission

1:10:32

now at Potsdam one final move John McCloy one of the great questions

1:10:38

was what we were going to do about the Russians in the bomb and whether we should notify Mr Stalin about it they

1:10:44

finally made up our minds that we had to being Partners uh but the question is what his attitude would be of course

1:10:54

if you make a communication of this sort uh to an ally in those sort of circumstances he will immediately come

1:11:00

back and ask for information and and require more and more information about it and this one of

1:11:08

course created an uh an embarrassing situation because it uh while it would

1:11:14

have it was agreed that the the Soviet Union should be told that this weapon

1:11:20

existed and it gives some perhaps some indication of its General nature there

1:11:26

was of course and could be I think no question of giving them any real information

1:11:32

and view of the fact that uh is the president nor I were anxious to have

1:11:39

them enter the war act we'd learned of this successful test

1:11:45

we were in doubt about what attitude we should take finally at lunch

1:11:52

one day we agreed that president that afternoon they should

1:11:59

walk over to Stalin and tell him and the words that he decided upon

1:12:06

uh but without going into any details and that afternoon at the conclusion of

1:12:13

the conference uh Belden Truman walked around to Stalin

1:12:20

with chip Boren our interpreter and uh

1:12:27

he told him that substantially this that uh

1:12:33

we uh want you to know journalismo that we have

1:12:41

now developed what we call a secret weapon

1:12:48

which is of a tremendous power and which in a few days we hope to use

1:12:56

in the war against Japan well knowing what he's going to do I

1:13:03

watched intently Mr Stalin's face

1:13:08

pretty much said well that's fine just with uh we'll use it and uh what What's

1:13:14

the next item on the agenda it let everybody down terribly because we were so worked up emotionally over this thing

1:13:20

I have always been in the opinion that Stalin did not grasp

1:13:26

the importance of the statement the Pentagon the final step to send the

1:13:33

509th on its Mission the order was issued on the date of July 25th 1945 was

1:13:41

addressed to Joe's foxes come in in the Strategic Air Forces and signed by General handy

1:13:47

was acting chief of staff it directed the 509th group

1:13:53

which was the special group trained for the delivery of the atomic bomb

1:13:58

would deliver its first bomb as soon as weather would permit visual bombing

1:14:04

after about August 3rd 1945 and one of the targets listed

1:14:11

namely Hiroshima kokora

1:14:17

niagata and Nagasaki the order stated that additional bonds

1:14:24

would be delivered on the above targets as soon as made ready by the project

1:14:30

staff and the further instructions would be concerning targets other than those

1:14:36

listed Potsdam one day after the bomb order goes out an ultimatum is delivered

1:14:42

to Japan despite the urgings of the state department it does not specifically tell the Japanese what they

1:14:47

can expect if they surrender there is still time

1:14:53

but little time for the Japanese to save themselves from the destruction which threatens

1:15:00

them July 27th the ultimatum reaches Tokyo in

1:15:06

Japan a million people have died in the fire raids food fuel clothing or running

1:15:12

out isolated behind the palace walls the

1:15:17

leaders need to consider the ultimatum it does not tell them whether or not they will be allowed to keep their

1:15:23

Emperor if they do surrender once again the leaders are deeply divided

1:15:30

my personal opinion was that the Potsdam declaration did outline the conditions

1:15:37

for the unconditional surrender since it did offer conditions for peace we should

1:15:43

accept the Declaration the dominant feeding in the Army was

1:15:48

that the decoration should not be accepted and that the decisive battle

1:15:54

should be fought on the mainland to The Bitter End

1:15:59

unconditional surrender was a term which was very difficult or rather utterly

1:16:06

impossible for Japan to accept wasn't there something anything better

1:16:11

than unconditional surrender July 29 the Japanese answer is

1:16:18

the ultimatum ignore it kill it with content August one as he

1:16:26

leaves the big three meeting the president hears the Japanese answer interprets it as a rejection does not

1:16:33

recall the bomb order that's the decision which the future will endlessly debate is taken

1:16:40

the atomic bomb will be used against Japan

1:16:50

tinium August 5 the bad weather of the past three days has cleared final

1:16:56

preparations for the dropping of the bomb are made the bomb had been brought in the day

1:17:02

before from this Assembly Building put into a pit underneath the plane

1:17:09

jacked up into the Bombay and fastened in place in the Palm Bay

1:17:18

and they was closed players belonged I went in there

1:17:23

take off the following morning the last routine steps are carried out

1:17:30

to drop the bomb they call little boy on Japan it was a briefing in one of the

1:17:38

temporary Parts at that briefing a number of the people in the Air Force

1:17:43

Crews learned for the first time something but the bomb they were to carry its power possibilities

1:17:50

there's quite a serious tense meeting for some of the people

1:17:55

there following that we were told to go get a good night's rest

1:18:00

uh now how I expected to tell you you're going to be going out dropping an atomic bomb or a big bomb and then tell you to

1:18:07

go get a good night's rest is something that I never figured out yet I think many others took sleeping tablets for

1:18:14

what good they were and then we set up played poker most of the evening at midnight there is a final weather

1:18:20

briefing then church services this was normal

1:18:26

everyone was expected and

1:18:32

did go to the church services we had our

1:18:37

midnight supper as it were and then

1:18:44

gathered all our gear together and drove down to the airplane we arrived at

1:18:50

our place I would guess so

1:18:57

an hour prior to the takeoff time and it look to me very much like

1:19:04

at least the television version of a Hollywood uh mapping there were many

1:19:10

dignitaries there military people a lot of pictures were taken a lot of

1:19:16

statements being made and we've got to blow our aircraft

1:19:28

in Tokyo The Divided leaders still argue over how to bring the war to an end

1:19:34

on board the Augusta at sea the president Waits

1:19:41

245 is a roll down the runway

1:19:47

Center Runway of three on the two other runways were observing

1:19:55

finds between neurons which were commonly the strike plane

1:20:01

the logo is very heavy the load of the bomb the fuel complaining from Tempest the pilot held

1:20:10

the plane on the runway closed from the last two feet of the runway the last moment he lifted the line will sail off

1:20:18

started off towards Japan now I am become death

1:20:24

the destroyer of worlds

1:20:32

perhaps this report on the decision of the government of the United States to drop an atomic bomb without warning

1:20:38

on a city of Japan can best be summarized in the words of a man who in the final days lived most closely with

1:20:46

that decision Henry L Stimson these are his words written in 1946.

1:20:53

the face of war is the face of death death is an inevitable part of every

1:21:00

order that a wartime leader gives the decision to use the atomic bomb was

1:21:06

a decision that brought death to over a hundred thousand Japanese

1:21:11

no explanation can change that fact but this deliberate premeditated

1:21:17

decision was our least abhorrent choice war in this Century has grown

1:21:24

increasingly more barbarous more destructive more debased in all its aspects

1:21:30

now with the release of atomic energy man's ability to destroy himself is

1:21:35

buried nearly complete the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki ended a war

1:21:42

they also made it holy clear that we must never have another War

1:21:47

there is no other choice

1:22:11

hi I'm Michael beschlas NBC News presidential historian I I sure hope you

1:22:17

found this documentary on the decision to drop the bomb as interesting as I did

1:22:23

it's very much of a 1965 work and the upside of that is that Chet Huntley in

1:22:29

his NBC News team were able to talk as you have seen to so many important

1:22:35

witnesses to history who by the 21st century sadly are all long gone

1:22:42

the other side of it is that that was a very different documentary than one we

1:22:48

might make in the 2020s and I thought I'd add this brief Coda to say why

1:22:54

probably we would add two questions today that Chet Huntley and Company did not ask number one many scholars now

1:23:02

believe that there's a considerable possibility that Harry Truman and the people around him although Justified and

1:23:08

dropping the bomb may have been also interested in the

1:23:14

possibility that showing the world that we had a nuclear weapon and we alone

1:23:19

would be a demonstration to Joseph Stalin on the Soviet Union of how

1:23:24

suddenly powerful the United States had become and would be a great addition to

1:23:29

us as we made arrangements for the end of World War II and also if there was a

1:23:35

cold war as that hostility unfolded the second question that was not asked

1:23:42

by Chen Huntley and the NBC News team of 1965 was one that we would certainly ask

1:23:49

today and that is if you look at Harry Truman and his advisors were they affected by

1:23:55

the knowledge that they were talking about dropping an atomic weapon

1:24:01

on an Asian City on a Japanese City and not a European city did race intervene

1:24:07

is there any possibility that they would have made a different decision if they

1:24:13

were making the decision to drop a bomb on the European city and keep in mind that Truman's recently

1:24:20

chosen Secretary of State James Burns of South Carolina who appears in the documentary was one of the most

1:24:27

notorious segregationists in the United States someone who certainly did not feel that Japanese were the equal of

1:24:35

Europeans did that play a role all that having been said what stands

1:24:42

out to me is how people of conscience at the time understood that this was not an

1:24:48

easy decision yes it might speed up the end of the war and foreclose an invasion of Japan but

1:24:55

did it open a nuclear age that would one day bring the end of the world no one

1:25:01

said this better in this film than Jay Robert Oppenheimer

1:25:06

if Oppenheimer came back to life today in the 2020s he would be shocked by the

1:25:12

degree to which nuclear weapons had spread to Rogue Nations and to terrorists and others probably would

1:25:20

redouble his efforts to make sure that there was some way the Earth did not end

1:25:26

in nuclear fire nowadays the Specter remains thank you

1:25:33

all for watching

" THE DECISION TO DROP THE BOMB "   1965 DOCUMENTARY  w/ CHET HUNTLEY  HIROSHIMA ATOMIC BOMB 90984

by PeriscopeFilm

Topics Bomb, 1965, Chet Huntley, Hiroshima, Atomic Bomb, Stock Footage

Item Size 615.7M

Dating to 1965, this documentary film "The Decision to Drop the Bomb" takes a look at the most difficult decision in President Harry Truman's term in office: the decision as to whether or not to use the newly-developed atomic bomb against Japan. The film was produced by Fred Freed for NBC-TV  and narrated by Chet Huntley. The film begins the moment that President Franklin Delano Roosevelt dies in office. The new president, Harry S. Truman, has only served in office for a brief time. People react in the streets to the news of the FDR's passing 1:35. Flag flies at half-mast 1:54. People stand outside the White House as Harry S. Truman takes the oath of office 2:10. Secretary of War Henry L Stimson, the sole cabinet member to know about the Manhattan Project, is shown 2:35. McGeorge Bundy speaks to the camera 2:48. The Pentagon is shown 3:20. Leslie Groves 3:31. E. R. Stettinius, Jr. walks out of a government building. Congressmen are shown in the chamber 4:05. Leo Szilard was a Hungarian-German-American physicist and inventor – father of the bomb project 4:20. Tape recorder is shown 4:27. The wife of Leo Szilard reads to the camera, the thoughts of her former husband, on the bomb 4:37. Harry Truman speaks to Congress for the first time 5:45. Soldiers are seen in Europe 6:36. The war in the atolls against the Japanese is shown 7:06. Oak Ridge Tennessee, a soldier walks the post 7:26. Man working inside a plant 7:45. Oak Ridge is manufacturing Uranium-235 7:58. McGeorge Bundy speaks to the camera 8:20. General Groves reflects about his time working on the bomb 9:05. Harry Truman is shown 9:33. The war in Europe continues in Berlin 9:40. McGeorge Bundy speaks to the camera 10:15. The war in Europe is over and Europe is in ruins 10:52. McGeorge Bundy speaks to the camera 11:15. Generals discuss war against Japan 12:20. The Joint Chiefs of Staff 12:35. Planes drop bombs on Japan 13:00. The Imperial Palace 13:20. Advisor to the Emperor, Koichi Kido speaks to the camera 13:29. Colonel Hayashi of Japan 14:04. Stimson and Truman walk in the garden 14:39. General Groves speaks to the camera 14:50. Japan tries to dig out from the bombing 15:43. The city is decimated 15:55. R. Gordon Arneson speaks to the camera 16:15. Dr. Robert Oppenheimer 16:55. James F Byrnes 17:22. R. Gordon Arneson speaks to the camera 17:30. Dr. James Conant 18:20. U.S. planes fly over Tokyo dropping bombs 18:45. Hero’s welcome for Dwight Eisenhower 19:15. Generals and politicians arrive at the White House 19:35. The Joint Chiefs 19:45. Lt. General Seizo Arisue of Japan 20:06. Dead bodies on the field of war 20:35. B-29s on the runway 20:59. The newly-built Pentagon is shown 21:15. John McCloy 21:20. Ralph Bard, Undersecretary of the Navy 21:37. Dr. Robert Oppenheimer 22:16. Dr. George Kistiakowsky 23:17. The cruiser USS Augusta at sea. The president watches a boxing match 24:53. Aerial view of Japanese city in ashes 25:00. Joseph Stalin 25:24. Truman at sea 25:36. Alamogordo, New Mexico, the atomic bomb test site 25:44. The scientists inside the base at Alamogordo 26:39. General Groves speaks to the camera 27:00. Dr. Kenneth Bainbridge 27:13. Dr. Donald Hornig 27:27. Mushroom cloud of the first test of the bomb 27:50. The cloud climbs into the sky 28:20. Robert Oppenheimer speaks after the bomb explodes 28:35. Aerial view of bomb site after the test 29:35. The meeting of the big three commences; Joseph Stalin is seen 30:40. Potsdam 31:00. Truman speaks at the podium 31:50. The big three sit in the garden 32:07. B-29s arrive on the tarmac 32:15. John McCloy speaks to the camera 33:07. Aerial view of bombed out Japanese towns 34:35. Truman leaves Potsdam 35:25. Truman aboard the Augusta 35:47. General Thomas Farrell 35:52. The Enola Gay takes off with the bomb, destined for Hiroshima 36:36. The destruction of Hiroshima 37:00. An NBC feature. Edited for education and presented by Encyclopedia Britannica Films. . We encourage viewers to add comments and, especially, to provide additional information about our videos by adding a comment!  See something interesting?  Tell people what it is and what they can see by writing something for example: "01:00:12:00 -- President Roosevelt is seen meeting with Winston Churchill at the Quebec Conference." This film is part of the Periscope Film LLC archive, one of the largest historic military, transportation, and aviation stock footage collections in the USA. Entirely film backed, this material is available for licensing in 24p HD, 2k and 4k. For more information visit http://www.PeriscopeFilm.com

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