12 November 2015

How Putin’s Ukrainian Dream Turned Into a Nightmare & Ukraine crisis in maps 20OKT15 & 18FEB15

putin has the vision of hitler, deranged, warped and self-deceiving. And just like hitler's reich, there isn't an opposition strong enough in Russia to challenge putin's destruction of the Russian economy and the lives of the Russian people. A quagmire in the Ukraine, a military foray in Syria which will no doubt turn into another quagmire, and the downing of Russian Metrojet flight 9268 over Sinai by an isis bomb (the leading suspected cause of the crash), costing the Russian people blood and millions of rubles they can't afford, how brutal at home will putin have to become to hold on to his presidency? He is ex-kgb, so nothing he does to control the Russian people will be surprising. Watching the demise of Russia should be a warning to the American electorate. Many of the republican candidates are too willing to escalate our military involvement in conflicts we should not be involved in to satisfy the war profiteers of the military-industrial complex. All need to remember what years in Iraq have done to our country and ask if we can afford more sacrificed for countries who don't appreciate and don't deserve it when we vote next November. Will we vote ourselves into war and economic and political decline? This from +Foreign Policy and +BBC News .....

How Putin’s Ukrainian Dream Turned Into a Nightmare

How Putin’s Ukrainian Dream Turned Into a Nightmare Whatever the larger goal of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s armed intervention in Syria, it has succeeded in distracting the world’s attention from his ongoing aggression in eastern Ukraine. In his half-hour speech at the United Nations in September, timed to reach a prime-time Russian audience, he spent only a minute on the Ukrainian conflict, focusing instead on Russia’s constructive role in the Middle East.
Putin’s rhetorical redirection is not surprising.
The Kremlin’s war in Ukraine is turning into a quagmire.
The Kremlin’s war in Ukraine is turning into a quagmire. Militarily, it is a stalemate — which, given the vast imbalance between Russian and Ukrainian capabilities, amounts to a Ukrainian victory. Ideologically, the war is a bust, as the Kremlin’s hopes of converting southeastern Ukraine into “New Russia” have been effectively, and perhaps permanently, shattered. Economically, the war and occupation of both Crimea and the Donbass have imposed ruinous costs on Russia, whose economy has already been battered by declining global commodity prices and Western sanctions. Socially, both regions are on the verge of a humanitarian catastrophe for which Russia would be blamed. In sum, Putin’s plans of weakening Ukraine have backfired. Ukraine is slowly getting stronger, while Russia is getting weaker. Time is, therefore, on the side of Ukraine and the West. They should avoid offering Putin any relief as long as Russian and proxy troops continue to occupy Ukrainian territory; on the contrary, they can and should press for additional concessions. Given Ukraine’s strengthened military and the threat of further sanctions, Putin will be unable to escalate the confrontation. Ironically, Putin’s self-defeating aggression in eastern Ukraine is now limiting his scope of action more effectively than anything the West could have devised.
Much of Putin’s authority at home rests on his ability to deliver steadily improving living standards as the upside of his authoritarian rule. But Russians of all income classes are tightening their belts. The sanctions have already cost the Russian economy 9 percent of GDP, according to the IMF. Since Russia’s invasion of Crimea in February 2014, the ruble has lost 50 percent of its value. In dollar-denominated terms, Russia’s GDP has fallen from $2.1 trillion in 2013 to an anticipated $1.2 trillion by the end of 2015. In dollar terms, the country’s economy has dropped from ninth in the world to 13th. Many Russian professionals are leaving the country, frustrated by its authoritarianism, corruption, and lack of interest in modernization.

Meanwhile, social and economic problems in the Russian-occupied Donbass enclave are mounting.
Meanwhile, social and economic problems in the Russian-occupied Donbass enclave are mounting. Many of the territory’s economic links with Ukraine have been disrupted. Its GDP has contracted by over 80 percent. Much of its infrastructure and its banking and administrative systems are in ruins. Large swaths of the territory suffer from shortages of gas, water, and electricity. Though it’s hard to know precise figures, unemployment is huge. A large proportion of the region’s skilled workers and professionals are internally displaced or in exile, mostly in Ukraine. Unsurprisingly, inflation is high and poverty is growing. In eastern Ukraine, Putin now has responsibility for a large population of about 3 million under de facto Russian occupation who are increasingly looking to Moscow to meet basic social needs. He must also cope with a rising criminal class in the self-styled Donetsk and Luhansk people’s republics. A parasitical conglomeration of local political bosses, powerful oligarchs, and criminal elements with roots in Soviet times have traditionally misruled this part of the Donbass. These elements are still around. At the same time, the collapsing economy has made contraband and smuggling, from Russia and Ukraine, one of the most lucrative and stable sources of income, thereby giving rise to new criminal entrepreneurs centered in the power structures of the republics. This development threatens to spread crime and instability into neighboring Russian regions. Statistics from Russia’s Ministry of Justice show a spike in the crime rate in parts of the country bordering on the occupied Donbass.
Adding to this litany of problems is the risk of further economic costs resulting from Russia’s aggression. In September, protesters belonging to Crimea’s beleaguered Tatar minority imposed a blockade on all trucks carrying goods to and from the occupied peninsula. On Sept. 22, Ukraine announced it would launch aggressive international litigation, seeking $50 billion in compensation for the Russian takeover of property and assets in Crimea and the damage inflicted by Russian weapons and fighters. As successful litigation by investors in the bankrupt oil company Yukos has shown, international courts have the ability to impose economic costs on Russia.
While Western pressure to facilitate a durable peaceful solution should remain a top priority for the European Union and the United States, forcing Ukraine into deep concessions to secure peace at any cost is a mistake. While Putin has dug himself and Russia into a hole, Ukraine is making steady, if unspectacular, progress toward reforming its economy, society, and political system, while retaining its democratic institutions, a free press, and a vigorous civil society. The banking sector is being fixed, energy subsidies have been reduced, and GDP growth is expected to be positive in 2016 — an enormous achievement after a contraction of over 20 percent in 2014-2015. Higher education and the police are being reformed. Government decentralization is being sharply debated and may soon be introduced. Corruption and the courts remain huge problems, but here, too, some inroads are likely to be made once a new National Anti-Corruption Bureau and prosecutor get to work in late 2015. If the prosecutor is genuinely independent, progress may be substantial.
The most serious counterargument against maintaining the sanctions regime and continuing to insist on Russian concessions is that Putin would respond to a tough Western stance by escalating the war in Ukraine, creating additional global mayhem.
But all evidence points in the opposite direction. A ground offensive would be hard-pressed to succeed in the face of an increasingly strong Ukrainian fighting force. Today, 40,000 well-supplied forces, led by officers proven in combat, defend Ukraine’s front line with the Donbass enclave. Ukraine has also arrayed 350 tanks and hundreds of pieces of heavy artillery in the region. It has developed its own drone industry for better intelligence and surveillance. In short, the country is ready to withstand an offensive from the east, and any territorial gains would result in thousands of casualties among the Russians and their proxies. There are also reports of declining morale among the proxy forces as it becomes increasingly clear that they are stuck in a long-term frozen conflict. The time for Putin to have invaded Ukraine was in the spring of 2014, when Ukraine’s government and armed forces were in disarray. Now, short of a major invasion, Russia is stuck.
An all-out Russian invasion, entailing bombardment of Ukrainian cities and forces, would trigger major new Western sanctions as well as embroil Russia in a second war. Hybrid war is one thing; the open use of Russian air power and massive deployment of Russian forces is another. Russia could expect not only international condemnation, but also economic isolation, including its likely removal from the international SWIFT banking system.
This last measure, which would devastate the Russian economy, has been the subject of Western policy discussions and is thus perfectly possible. And Putin could expect a backlash at home. While Russian public opinion supports the separatist cause in the Donbass, it opposes by a stable majority direct Russian military intervention in Ukraine. Unsurprisingly, Putin’s propaganda machine has assiduously hidden the fact of a Russian military presence in Ukraine, and of substantial Russian troop losses, from citizens. Putin’s legitimacy among and support by the Russian policy elite would also suffer. Hard-line nationalists already regard his abandonment of the New Russia project as a betrayal of Russian interests.
In sum, Putin’s adventure in eastern Ukraine is now dragging him down. The temporary upside for his popularity is outweighed by the economic burdens of the occupation and the costs of further expansion. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, Putin may be losing interest in the Ukraine project. A person party to the Sept. 2 phone conversation among French President François Hollande, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, and Putin said that the Russian president appeared unengaged and was not in command of the nuanced details of the discussion. Instead, he was more interested in complaining that Ukraine was not buying Russian gas at a cheaper price than it gets from European and other international sources.

For the West, Putin’s quagmire in eastern Ukraine and his dangerous recent intervention in Syria are excellent news.
For the West, Putin’s quagmire in eastern Ukraine and his dangerous recent intervention in Syria are excellent news. Russia’s foreign policy rests on an eroding economic and political foundation, and the West need only sustain Russia’s Donbass mess for the Kremlin to become more pliant and amenable to compromise. It is as if Putin has himself contained Russia. The West need do little more than maintain the status quo. The West should pursue two aims. First, it should keep Ukraine sovereign and stable and promote its reform process — which is exactly what the West has been and is doing anyway. Second, the West should maintain strong sanctions on Russia until all its forces and heavy weapons are withdrawn from occupied Ukrainian territory.
Just as importantly, the United States and Europe should clearly and unequivocally label Russia the occupying power in the Donbass and press Russia to provide adequate socioeconomic assistance to the 3 million Ukrainian citizens under its control. At the same time, the leaders in Kiev must make clear to its citizens in the Donbass that they will be ready to help them, but if and only if the Russian occupation ends. Until that time, Ukraine and the West must do all they can to press Russia to compensate Donbass residents for the damage it has inflicted upon them.
Western policy also should refrain from pressuring Ukraine to absorb the economic burden for rebuilding the Donbass, even if Russia withdraws all its forces, weapons, and bases. The costs must be shared among Russia, which caused most of the destruction, Ukraine, the victim of Russia’s aggression, and the international community. Russia’s cost sharing can be pitched as a face-saving humanitarian gesture by the Kremlin to rebuild the Donbass and save its population from disaster.

For the first time since Putin invaded Crimea, the West and Ukraine have the upper hand.
For the first time since Putin invaded Crimea, the West and Ukraine have the upper hand. They should play it and force Putin to agree to a genuine peace in Ukraine. He could do it. He started the war in 2014. He forced the separatists to accept a cease-fire on Sept. 1, 2015. If confronted with a tough Western stance, he just might draw the right conclusion and actually end the war with Ukraine. The photo, taken on Oct. 13, 2015 in Donetsk, shows a bullet-ridden road sign in front of the city’s ruined international airport.
Photo credit: ALEKSEY FILIPPOV/AFP/Getty Images
Corrections, Oct. 21, 2015: Vladimir Putin’s speech at the United Nations took place in September; an earlier version of this article mistakenly said the speech took place this month (October). Russia’s GDP has fallen from $2.1 trillion in 2013 to an anticipated $1.2 trillion by the end of 2015; an earlier version of this article mistakenly used the amounts $2.1 billion and $1.2 billion. Russia invaded Crimea in February 2014; an earlier version of this article mistakenly said the invasion occurred this past February (2015).

Ukraine crisis in maps

  • 18 February 2015
  • From the section Europe
  • Anti-government protester carrying the national flag through Independence Square in Kiev, Feb 2014.

The crisis in Ukraine began in November 2013 when pro-Moscow President Viktor Yanukovych's government abandoned a deal with the European Union in favour of stronger ties with Russia.
Ukraine has been torn between east and west since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Ukrainian is the main language in western regions - where there is also a long-standing aspiration for integration with Europe. However, Russian is predominant in parts of the east and south.

2013 protests

Outraged by the move towards Moscow, anti-government demonstrations take place in Kiev with an estimated 100,000 on the streets. By December, some 800,000 people rally in the capital and protesters occupy city hall and Independence Square.
Kiev protest showing independence square

Protests spread

In mid-January, parliament passes restrictive anti-protest laws as clashes turn deadly. Anti-Yanukovych protesters begin storming regional government offices in other parts of western Ukraine.
Unrest map

On 20 February, 2014, bloodshed reaches its worst since the start of the crisis. At least 88 people are killed in 48 hours in Kiev and hundreds wounded in clashes between protesters and police, including many shot by uniformed snipers. President Yanukovych disappears and protesters take control of government buildings.
Parliament votes to remove the president from power, with elections set for 25 May. The elite Berkut police unit, blamed for deaths of protesters, is disbanded. Parliament also votes to ban Russian as the second official language, triggering a wave of anger in Russian-speaking regions - although the vote is later overturned.


On 27-28 February, pro-Russian gunmen seize key buildings in the Crimean capital, Simferopol. The majority of Crimea's 2.3 million population identify themselves as ethnic Russians and speak Russian - a legacy of Russia's 200-year involvement in the region. Sevastopol in Crimea is also the historic base of Russia's Black Sea Fleet.
Within days, the Crimean parliament votes to join Russia and calls a referendum. Russia later admits that its military helped the Crimea insurgents.
 Map showing Crimea and Simferopol

On 16 March, 97% of referendum voters reportedly back the proposal to join Russia. The figure is later disputed, with leaked documents showing only 50-60% support for the move.
The EU and US condemn the annexation of Crimea and impose a first round of sanctions on Russian officials and high-ranking Moscow allies in Ukraine.

Trouble spreads east

After Ukrainian troops withdraw from Crimea, there are reports of many Russian troops gathering in border areas adjacent to the eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, Ukraine's industrial heartland.
On 7 April, protesters occupy government buildings in the eastern cities of Donetsk, Luhansk and Kharkiv.
Although Kharkiv is retaken the following day, the occupations spread to other cities, and a number of pro-Russian leaders declare that referendums on granting greater autonomy to eastern regions will be held.

Towns targeted by separatists, April 2014

Map: showing Donetsk and Luhansk

Eastern referendums

On 11 May pro-Russian separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk declare independence as "people's republics" after the referendums, which were not recognised by Kiev or the West.
Map showing where referendums were being held on 11 May

A build-up of Russian troops on the shared border in April sparks concern that another annexation could take place.

Presidential election

Elections for a new president in Ukraine are held on 25 May, resulting in confectionery tycoon Petro Poroshenko being elected with more than 55% of the vote, although no polling stations were open in Donetsk city and several other locations.
Map showing rebel-held area in June

On 20 June, President Poroshenko announces a 15-point peace plan and declares a week-long truce. It holds for a few days until a military helicopter is shot down over eastern Ukraine.
With a government offensive launched once more, on 5 July rebels abandon strongholds in the north of Donetsk region, withdrawing to a smaller area of insurgency in the south.

Malaysia Airlines tragedy, 17 July 2014

Map showing the crash site of flight MH17 and the areas of east Ukraine under rebel control

On 17 July Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 from Amsterdam is shot down near the village of Grabove, in rebel-held territory close to the border with Russia.
The crash kills 298 people - everybody aboard the airliner. The Netherlands has the biggest death toll (196), then Malaysia (42) and Australia (27). Western nations blame a Russian-supplied missile, believed to have been fired by rebels.
Russia denies it had armed the rebels and argues instead that a Ukrainian fighter jet had flown near the airliner at the time.
Satellite images show the large debris field near Grabove

Image caption Satellite image shows plane debris littering a wide area near the village of Grabove
Ukraine insists Russian regular forces are involved in the fighting in Ukraine. It also accuses the Russian authorities of allowing well-trained volunteers and heavy weapons to cross the border to help the rebels. Russia dismisses those accusations, yet the rebel leader in Donetsk says many Russian soldiers have joined the rebel cause.

New front

Ukrainian forces make gains in some areas previously held by the rebels. But on 27 August the rebels - allegedly backed by Russian heavy armour - open up a new front on the coast, seizing the town of Novoazovsk and threatening the strategic port city of Mariupol.
Map showing the battle lines in eastern Ukraine 27 August 2014


A ceasefire is agreed on 5 September between Ukraine and the pro-Russian rebels in the east. Signed in Minsk, Belarus, it is violated just four days later when fierce fighting erupts around Donetsk airport.
The battle for the airport continues with the Ukrainians remaining in control, although it is now so badly damaged that it is closed to flights.
Map showing the battle lines in eastern Ukraine 19 September 2014

Elsewhere in the east there are repeated violations of the truce. By 19 September, the rebels control a stretch along the Russian border to the coast.

Fresh elections

On 26 October Ukrainians vote for a new parliament. Pro-West parties triumph but the polls are boycotted in the rebel-held east - which goes on to hold its own elections on 2 November.
Two pro-Russian leaders are declared the winners - but President Petro Poroshenko immediately threatens to scrap a law (agreed under the 5 September truce) which gave special status to Donetsk and Luhansk.

Donetsk airport falls

In January 2015, fighting between the army and the rebels intensifies in and around Donetsk, as well as in Luhansk region. Both sides seem to be battling for new ground, keen to strengthen their negotiating positions ahead of any "peace summit".
Map showing the battle lines in eastern Ukraine 23 January 2015

On 22 January, Ukrainian forces withdraw from Donetsk airport's main terminal, after weeks of bitter fighting. The airport is strategically important. Government forces had been able to shell rebel positions inside nearby Donetsk - the largest city held by the militants.
There are fears its capture could help the rebels to resupply - allowing munitions, hardware and manpower to be airlifted into the conflict zone. But drone images of the airport taken in January show how devastated the terminal building is.
Terminal building 2014
Terminal building 2015

The rebels continue their offensive in February.
Map showing fighting around Debaltseve

The fiercest fighting is near the town of Debaltseve, where the rebels are trying to surround Ukrainian troops. The town is a crucial rail hub linking Donetsk and Luhansk.

February diplomatic push

As clashes continue there is a renewed diplomatic push to end the fighting. Meanwhile, a truce allows civilians to leave Debaltseve.
On 12 February - after marathon talks in the Belarus capital, Minsk, an agreement is reached to end the fighting. The leaders of Russia, Ukraine, Germany and France announce that a ceasefire will begin on 15 February. The deal also includes weapon withdrawals and prisoner exchanges, but key issues remain to be settled.
The pro-Russian rebels in eastern Ukraine also sign the agreement which includes a buffer zone for heavy weapons, with a minimum of 50km (30 miles) between rival forces' artillery (140km for rockets).
Map showing ceasefire lines

Withdrawal from Debaltseve

Despite the ceasefire, heavy fighting continues around Debaltseve with rebel forces pressing to capture the strategically important road and rail hub, to join up territory held in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
Map: Debaltseve area

On 18 February, President Poroshenko announces that 80% of Ukrainian forces have pulled back from the town towards Artemivsk.
Eyewitnesses report dozens of tanks and columns of weary troops retreating, while a Russian TV station shows footage of what it says is a rebel flag being raised on a high-rise building in the town.