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Showing posts with label communism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label communism. Show all posts

02 February 2017

"THE TUNNELS" BY GREG MITCHELL 2FEB17

<b>ORDER MY NEW BOOK</b>
I am old enough to remember news reports about East Germans escaping or attempting to escape to the West through tunnels and by other means and frequently enough to be a reminder to the rest of the world the brutality of communism. I was visiting friends with my sister in West Germany in 1988 and we tried to go to West Berlin by train to see the Wall and the city but never got there. Anti-government protest were already breaking out in East Berlin, the government and their Soviet masters were getting nervous and so stopped all rail and autobahn travel from the West to West Berlin. Just a little over a year later the Wall came tumbling down....Everything I have heard and read about The Tunnels is good, I look forward to reading it. This from Greg Mitchell's blog Pressing Issues. Click the title to go to his blog to order the book (I ordered mine from Powell's, an independent book seller) at a discount (from Amazon).


is author of a dozen books (click on covers at right), including the new "THE TUNNELS: Escapes Under the Berlin Wall and the Historic Films the JFK White House Tried to Kill." He was the longtime editor of Editor & Publisher. Email: epic1934@aol.com. Twitter: @GregMitch


The Tunnels


Escapes Under the Berlin Wall and the Historic Films the JFK White House Tried to Kill Hardcover

A thrilling, true-life Cold War narrative exploring two harrowing attempts to rescue East Germans by tunneling beneath the Berlin Wall, the U.S. television networks who financed and filmed them, and the Kennedy administration's unprecedented attempt to suppress both films. Click on "buy" button at left to order from Amazon, B & N,  or independent bookstores.
“Shows the trade-off behind the scenes at one of the most pivotal moments in the standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union…A fascinating and complex picture of the interplay between politics and media in the Cold War era.” – Washington Post
"The greatest strength of The Tunnels is in the details....Days after finishing the book I could not escape one of Mitchell’s images–of a hat with a small hole in it landing softly on the Western side of the border while its owner’s dead body fell back into the East, waiting for the guards to hurry it out of sight. For those who see walls as the answer to policy problems, this book serves as a stark reminder that barriers can never cut people off entirely but only succeed in driving them underground.” -- The New York Times Book Review
"A story with so much inherent drama it sounds far-fetched even for a Hollywood thriller....Mitchell tells a kaleidoscopic cold war story from 1962, recreating a world seemingly on the edge of a third world war. " -- The Guardian
“Fascinating – and it is all true.” – Frederick Forsyth, author The Odessa File and Day of the Jackal
Featured by Scott Simon on NPR's "Weekend Edition"
In the summer of 1962, one year after East German Communists built the Berlin Wall, a group of daring young West Germans came up with a plan. They would risk prison, Stasi torture, even death to liberate friends, lovers, and strangers in East Berlin by digging tunnels under the Wall. Among the tunnelers and escape helpers were a legendary cyclist and an American student from Stanford.
Then two U.S. television networks, NBC and CBS, heard about the secret projects, and raced to be first to air a spectacular "inside tunnel" special on the human will for freedom. The networks funded two separate tunnels in return for exclusive rights to film the escapes. In response, President John F. Kennedy and Secretary of State Dean Rusk, wary of anything that might raise tensions and force a military confrontation with the Soviets, maneuvered to quash both documentaries.
Unfolding week by week, sometimes hour by hour, Greg Mitchell's riveting narrative deftly cuts back and forth from one extraordinary character to another.  There's the tunneler who had already served four years in the East German gulag; the Stasi informer who betrays the "CBS tunnel"; the young East Berliner who escapes with her baby, then marries one of the tunnelers; and broadcast legend Daniel Schorr, who battled unsuccessfully to save his film from White House interference and remained bitter about it to the end of his life. Looming over all is John F. Kennedy, who was ambivalent about--even hostile toward-- the escape operations.  Kennedy confessed to Dean Rusk:  "We don't care about East Berlin."
Based on extensive access to the Stasi archives, long-secret U.S. documents, and new interviews with tunnelers and refugees, The Tunnels provides both rich history and high suspense.  Award-winning journalist Mitchell captures the hopes and fears of everyday Berliners; the chilling reach of the Stasi secret police; U.S. networks prepared to "pay for play" yet willing to cave to official pressure; and a White House and State Department eager to suppress historic coverage. The result is a propulsive read whose themes reverberate even today.

PRAISE

"Greg Mitchell has written a riveting story focusing on one of the most powerful documentaries ever broadcast on television, NBC’s The Tunnel.  John Le Carré couldn’t have done it better."
BILL MOYERS
The Tunnels is one of the great untold stories of the Cold War. Brilliantly researched and told with great flair, Greg Mitchell’s non-fiction narrative reads like the best spy thriller, something Le Carré might have imagined. Easily the best book I’ve read all year.”
ALEX KERSHAW, author of Avenue of Spies
"Mitchell delivers a gripping, blow-by-blow account." --Publishers Weekly (*starred review)
“Greg Mitchell is the best kind of historian, a true storyteller. The Tunnels is a gripping tale about heroic individuals defying an authoritarian state at a critical moment in the Cold War. A brilliantly told thriller—but all true.”
KAI BIRD, author of The Good Spy
“When you have read the last page of Greg Mitchell’s The Tunnels you will close the book—but not until then.”
ALAN FURST, author of A Hero of France and Night Soldiers
The Tunnels uncovers an unexplored underworld of Cold War intrigue. As nuclear tensions grip Berlin, a whole realm of heroes and villains, of plot and counterplot, unfolds beneath the surface of the city. True historical drama.”
RON ROSENBAUM, author of Explaining Hitler and The Shakespeare Wars

“A compelling look at a wrenching chapter of the Cold War that chronicles the desperate flights for freedom beneath the streets of post-war Berlin and the costs that politics extracted in lives.”
BARRY MEIER, author of Missing Man


EXCERPT

1
The Cyclist
FEBRUARY–MARCH 1962
Harry Seidel loved action, speed, risk. He found them all in bicycle racing. Harry might have been an Olympic champion—still could be, probably—if he changed his attitude, for at twenty-three he remained in his leg--churning prime. But that wasn’t Harry. Once he set his mind on something he went full bore, and now he wasn’t chasing the next turn, other racers, or a finish line. Just months ago he had competed before thousands of cheering fans in raucous arenas. His picture appeared in newspapers. Children might call out to the lean, dark-haired sports hero when they recognized him cycling on the streets of Berlin. Now he toiled nearly alone. No one cheered, even if he deserved it for victories far beyond any of his racing exploits. That would be too dangerous.
Since the emergence of the new barrier dividing Berlin on August 13, 1961, Harry’s wife, Rotraut, had worried about him. Whenever he set off on one of his secret missions she wondered if he would fail to come home, perhaps forever. Friends called Harry a draufgänger—a daredevil. They urged him to quit his death-defying deeds, return to cycling, and open that newspaper kiosk he coveted, but they might as well have been shouting into a wintry wind off the River Spree. In just the first months after the Wall arrived, Seidel had led his wife and son, and more than two dozen others, across the nearly impenetrable border to the West. And in Harry’s mind there were still countless others (that is, nearly anyone in the East) to rescue.
Seidel had drawn only praise from the state during his cycling career, which had culminated in several East Berlin titles and two medals at the 1959 East German championships. Barely out of his teens, he quit his job as an electrician when the state began paying him to compete full-time. Even as he was being extolled in propaganda organs, Harry revealed himself as insufficiently patriotic when, unlike many others on the national team, he refused to ingest steroids to enhance his performance. He also failed to join the ruling Communist Party. This cost him any chance to make the country’s 1960 Olympic team, and his government stipend was canceled.
Now, in early 1962, his reputation in East German secret police files as an escape helper matched his fame as a cyclist. The trade had not come without cost.
Seidel’s first escape had been his own. Just hours after the wire and concrete barrier materialized to brutally divide Berlin on the morning of August 13, Seidel left the apartment he shared with his wife, son, and mother-in-law in the Prenzlauer Berg district to explore the border by bicycle. South of the city center he found a spot where the barbed wire was low. With guards distracted by protesters, he shouldered his bike and leaped over the wire. It was a test more than anything. He figured he could return to the East just as easily—which he did, a few hours later, passing through a checkpoint. (It was still no problem going in that direction.) Harry being Harry, he felt confident he could jump the border again in the hours ahead. He wasn’t eager to abandon Rotraut and baby Andre, but he didn’t want to lose the newspaper delivery job he held in the West. Even if he did get stuck across the barrier he would surely find a way to get his family, including his mother, out soon.
Later that day Harry considered another vault to the West, but it looked like the border guards were tightening their controls. Just after dark he wrapped his passport in plastic and dove into the Spree to swim the more than two hundred yards to the West. Coming up for air he nearly head-butted an East Berlin police boat. Treading water, he finally heard one of the cops say, “Let’s go, nothing to see here.” After they left he swam the rest of the way to the shore.
While Seidel pondered how to rescue his family, one of Rotraut’s brothers tried to get them out using West German passports bearing photos that resembled them. When that brother attempted to smuggle the fake IDs through a checkpoint, they did not pass muster. Harry’s mother and mother-in-law were arrested. His wife remained free only because she had a baby to care for. Harry, enraged, vowed to retrieve his mother when she emerged from prison—and to spring his wife and son immediately.
After another bicycle tour, this time along the Western side of the Wall, he determined that the safest place for a breakout was along Kiefholz Strasse, near Treptower, one of the city’s largest parks. There was nothing but barbed wire—no fencing or concrete—at the border there, and plenty of trees and bushes in the American-occupied zone for cover. To provide a blanket of darkness he shot out a couple of spotlights with an air rifle.
On the evening of September 3, 1961, three weeks after the coming of the Wall, Rotraut, slender and blue-eyed, received an unexpected phone call at her apartment. Harry, calling from a café in the East, announced that he would pick her up in an hour. Rotraut, whose family had emigrated from Poland, was as anti-Communist as her husband and had been considering ways to escape on her own, so the invitation from Harry was most welcome. When he arrived he told her to dress in black, give their baby part of a sleeping pill, and follow him. Soon they were penetrating the underbrush along Kiefholz Strasse, where Harry had already cut the barbed wire. He crawled through, then stood and lifted the top wire. Rotraut passed him the baby and stepped into the West. Then with Harry she ran like hell to his Ford Taunus. Minutes later the three Seidels were relaxing in Harry’s apartment in the Schöneberg district.
The ending was not so happy for two of Rotraut’s brothers, who were arrested on charges that they knew about or assisted the escape.
Few in East Berlin imagined that any sort of wall—or “anti-Fascist protection barrier,” as East German leader Walter Ulbricht dubbed it (proving he had read his Orwell)—could last for years. But Harry Seidel was not among the optimistic. He believed the vast, ugly scar and police state were meant to be permanent. And what could the West do about it? Berlin was a fractured island floating precariously in the middle of the Communist state, one hundred miles from West Germany. Harry Seidel sensed that his adventures at the border had barely begun. For one thing, he still had to rescue his mother.
After years of shortages and rationing, East Berliners liked to quip that even when they could afford to buy apples and potatoes they often found worms in them—and “they charge more with the worms.” Another bitter joke: “Did you know that Adam and Eve were actually East Germans? They had no clothes, they had to share an apple, and they were led to believe that they lived in a paradise.”
Since shortly after World War II, a wavy line on the map had separated the two German states, even before they took the names German Democratic Republic (GDR) and Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). West Germany was divided into sectors occupied by the Americans, the French, and the English. The Soviet-dominated GDR was Germany’s junior half, in landmass, population, and increasingly, economic performance. In 1955, with its economy booming and jobs plentiful, West Germany achieved full sovereignty, even as the three occupying forces remained. The Communists in the East, meanwhile, scrambled to stem an embarrassing refugee crisis. From the late 1940s to 1961 some 2.8 million East Germans fled to the West.
Most of this human tide, nearly 20 percent of the East German population and a high concentration of its skilled workers and professionals, exited via Berlin. GDR soldiers tightly policed the national boundary, but the sector border at Berlin, deep inside East Germany, remained porous. Levels of security varied wildly where the city’s four sectors met. Berlin remained, in most ways, one city, with interconnected telephone service, subway, train, tram, and bus lines. As many as sixty thousand East Berliners with official passes—teachers, doctors, engineers, lawyers, technicians, students—crossed into the West every weekday to work or attend classes at the Technical University or the Free University. They were known as grenzgänger—border crossers. Many never returned. By 1961, West Berlin’s population of 2.2 million doubled that of the Eastern sector.
The Soviets grew alarmed. Premier Nikita Khrushchev considered West Berlin “a bone in my throat,” even as he also likened it to testicles he could squeeze whenever he wanted the West to scream. Khruschchev had issued an ultimatum in November 1958 giving the three Western nations six months to agree to make West Berlin a “free,” demilitarized zone, and then withdraw. The Allies rejected this. They held that the unnatural division of the city had to end in free elections in every sector and, ultimately, in reunification. Khrushchev backed down for the moment. Running for president in 1960, John F. Kennedy predicted Berlin would continue to be a “test of our nerve and our will.”
The first Kennedy–Khrushchev summit took place in early June, 1961, in Vienna. The sixty-seven-year-old Soviet leader opened by calling Berlin “the most dangerous place in the world.” Testing the inexperienced JFK, he threatened to finally sign a long-promised “peace treaty” with East Germany, ending the four-power agreements on sharing Berlin. The East Germans would thereby gain control of all Western access to the city via air, rail, and autobahn. Again, the three Western nations rejected the idea. Yet a fumbling, intimidated Kennedy hinted that the United States now accepted the semipermanent division of Berlin, which only emboldened Khrushchev.
As the summit ended, Kennedy privately called it “the worst thing in my life. He savaged me.” JFK told aides there was little America could do for the East Berliners—the sole goal now was to defend the interests of those already in the West. He assured a top aide, “God knows I’m not an isolationist, but it seems particularly stupid to risk killing a million Americans over an argument about access rights on an autobahn . . . or because the Germans want Germany reunified.” After all, he added, “We didn’t cause the disunity in Germany.”
In a July 25, 1961, speech, Kennedy declared that the United States was not looking for another confrontation on Berlin. Still, in light of the Soviets’ growing belligerence there, JFK ordered a military buildup. “We seek peace,” Kennedy announced, “but we shall not surrender.” West Berliners focused on another element of the speech: Kennedy seemed to suggest that while America would remain a strong defender of West Germany, it would let the Communists do pretty much whatever they wanted in the East. Amid the growing tensions, the number of East Germans arriving at West Berlin’s refugee center, a colony of twenty-five buildings at Marienfelde, spiked. The rate had averaged 19,000 a month in 1961; this more than doubled in early August. East Germans had never been allowed to participate in free elections but they were voting with their feet.
Walter Ulbricht, the sixty-eight-year-old East German leader with a Lenin goatee, had seen enough. With Khrushchev’s blessing, he had weeks earlier ordered the stockpiling of massive quantities of barbed wire, fencing, and concrete blocks, his fantasy of a permanent barrier encircling West Berlin suddenly about to come to life. Somehow, despite their vast investment in intelligence operations in Berlin, the Americans knew little about any of this. President Kennedy’s daily CIA briefings mentioned nothing.
Not that it likely mattered. American leaders were profoundly ambivalent about the prospect of any sealing of the border. Ulbricht took heart from a well--publicized July 30 television interview with J. William Fulbright, an influential Democratic U.S. senator. Asked whether the Communists might reduce tensions by barring refugee flight, Fulbright answered, “Next week, if they chose to close their borders, they could without violating any treaty. I don’t understand why the East Germans don’t close their border. . . . I think they have a right to close it at any time.” West German media and American diplomats in Bonn, the capital, excoriated Fulbright. Some called him “Fulbricht.”
President Kennedy said nothing in public. But at the White House he told an adviser, “Khrushchev is losing East Germany. He cannot let that happen. If East Germany goes, so will Poland and all of Eastern Europe. He will have to do something to stop the flow of refugees. Perhaps a wall. And we won’t be able to prevent it.” Khrushchev, meanwhile, assured Ulbricht, “When the border is closed, the Americans and West Germans will be happy.” He claimed that the American ambassador to Moscow had told him the increasing intensity of the refugee flight was “causing the West Germans a lot of trouble. So when we institute these controls, everyone will be satisfied.” Ulbricht assigned his security chief, Erich Honecker, to make sure the operation succeeded.
Just after midnight on August 13 the first barbed wire was unrolled along major boulevards at the border, the first step in sealing off the ninety-six-mile circumference of West Berlin. Thousands of Soviet troops stood in reserve in case demonstrators in the West tried to stop it. Khrushchev had wisely advised Ulbricht to make sure the wire did not extend even one inch across the border.
When Secretary of State Dean Rusk heard the news later that morning, he ordered that U.S. officials refrain from issuing statements beyond mild protests. Any American response at the border, he feared, would trigger an escalation on the Communist side. Then he left his office to attend a Washington Senators baseball game. U.S. diplomats hoped West Berlin mayor Willy Brandt would not hear about Rusk’s outing, nor the reaction of Foy Kohler, one of Rusk’s aides: “The East Germans have done us a favor.”
More than ever, East Berlin was an armed camp, CBS correspondent Daniel Schorr reported that day. Troops were needed, he added, to hold back a “sullen population.” That night, Edward R. Murrow, the legendary newsman who had left CBS to direct the administration’s U.S. Information Agency (USIA), cabled his friend Jack Kennedy from Berlin, comparing Ulbricht’s move to Hitler’s marching into the Rhineland. He warned JFK that if he didn’t show resolve he might face a crisis of confidence both in West Germany and around the globe.
Residents in the East had adapted to the arbitrary division of their city, but the character of that cleaving had changed for the worse that morning of August 13. Tens of thousands suddenly lost their jobs in the West or a chance to complete their studies, as well as freedom to visit friends, family, and lovers. Finishing their routes in East Berlin, the U‑Bahn subway and S‑Bahn elevated trains now discharged passengers at the border.
On August 14, Kennedy nevertheless told aides, that “It’s not a very nice solution, but a wall is a hell of a lot better than a war.” In the same discussion, he said, “This is the end of the Berlin crisis. The other side panicked—not we. We’re going to do nothing now because there is no alternative except war. It’s all over, they’re not going to overrun Berlin.” American intelligence was almost sanguine. Kennedy’s CIA briefing on August 14 dryly referred to new “travel limitations” and “restrictions” in Berlin. The next day the CIA claimed that the East German and East Berlin populations were “generally reacting with caution,” with only “scattered expressions of open criticism and a few instances of anti--regime incidents.” The agency may not have known that at least ten East German border guards had already fled to the West.
The administration’s high--level Berlin Task Force, meeting in Washington, focused more on public relations than on countering the Soviet move with sanctions. Secretary of State Rusk stated that while the border closing was a serious matter, “in realistic terms it would make a Berlin settlement easier. Our immediate problem is the sense of outrage in Berlin and Germany which carries with it a feeling that we should do more than merely protest.” Attorney General Robert Kennedy merely called for a boost in anti--Soviet propaganda.
On August 16, the front page of the popular West German newspaper Bild Zeitung screamed, “The West Does Nothing!” President Kennedy, it complained, “stays silent.” Mayor Willy Brandt cabled a forceful message to Kennedy. He criticized the “inactivity and pure defensiveness” of the Allies, which could lead to a collapse of morale in West Berlin while promoting “an exaggerated self--confidence in the East Berlin regime.” If nothing was done, the next step was for the Communists to turn West Berlin into an isolated “ghetto” from which many of its citizens would flee. Kennedy must reject Soviet blackmail. At a giant rally in Berlin that evening, Brandt cried, “Berlin expects more than words! Berlin expects political action!”
Kennedy was unmoved, partly because he thought Brandt’s anger was motivated as much by electoral politics as anything else. He privately referred to Brandt as “that bastard from Berlin.”
Within days of the erection of the concrete and barbed wire, East Germans were jumping out windows of buildings adjacent to the border along several blocks of Bernauer Strasse in the Mitte (or “middle”) district, landing on the sidewalk in West Berlin. This was only possible in sections of the city where the façades of buildings marked the border. In some cases West Berlin firemen caught jumpers with their nets. A little more than a week after August 13 the first East Berliner died attempting to flee. This was Ida Siekmann, fifty-eight, who literally took flight after throwing a mattress and other belongings out the window of her third-floor apartment on Bernauer Strasse. Siekmann missed landing on the mattress and died on the way to the hospital. West Berliners were outraged. East Berlin workers bricked up windows facing West as quickly as possible.
Two days after Siekmann’s fatal leap, a twenty-five-year-old tailor named Günter Litfin was shot and killed at Berlin’s Humboldt Harbor. Litfin, one of the thousands of East Berliners who could no longer commute to a job in the West, had nearly finished his desperate swim to the opposite shore when he was shot in the back of the head by a border guard. Within hours, hundreds of West Berliners gathered there and screamed their protest. Police arrested Litfin’s brother and ransacked his mother’s apartment. East German media launched a smear campaign against the dead man, labeling him a homosexual whose nickname was “Doll.” Each guard who fired at Litfin received a medal, a wristwatch, and a cash bonus.
A West Berlin newspaper declared: “Ulbricht’s human hunters have become murderers.” A few days after Litfin’s death, another young East Berliner was shot dead in the Treptow Canal. Within days, three more died after climbing out of windows or falling off roofs at Bernauer Strasse. In October, two more young men were shot and killed in the River Spree. Early in the Wall era, most West Berliners believed that however callous the system in the East might be, soldiers or border guards would not shoot their fellow Germans. This hope was already proving false, over and over
Determined escapees remained undaunted. One couple swam across the Spree to the other side—pushing a tub with their three--year--old daughter in front of them.
By mid-October an eight-foot wall had replaced the barbed wire in more sections of the city. A Berlin sculptor described the Wall’s disjointed, slipshod construction as appearing to have “been thrown together by a band of backward apprentice stonemasons, when drunk.” Where dissidents found they could scale or blast through the concrete, GDR workers made the barrier even higher and thicker, and guard towers sprouted like mushrooms. On the side of the Wall facing west, graffiti appeared: KZ, the Nazi initials for concentration camp. Hundreds still made it to the West—through the sewers, in vehicles that smashed through bricks, in a train that refused to stop at the border. The Wall was both too much, and not quite enough.

30 January 2016

The Problem With Poland’s New Nationalism 27JAN16 & Holocaust- The Liberation Of Auschwitz (VIDEO)



POLAND. I have long been fascinated by her history and her struggle for true independence and her glorious period as a Republic. More recently I still remember the struggle of Solidarity and the Polish Catholic Church against the communist government in the 1980's. EU and NATO membership seemed to signal the Polish people's commitment to freedom, democracy, human rights, liberty. Sadly, they are politically on the cusp of returning to the state of fear and repression reminiscent of the decades of communist rule and the brutal nazi occupation. This is especially poignant considering 27 JAN 16 was the 71st anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz by Ukrainian soviet forces and the current government's attitude to the wave of refugees seeking peace, freedom and life across Europe. Reflecting on the history of the Polish nation and Polish nationalism as outlined in this piece from +Foreign Policy is Polish history doomed to repeat itself? 

The Problem With Poland’s New Nationalism



The Problem With Poland’s New Nationalism
Among the greatest misfortunes resulting from the election of the current Polish government is that it has given Polish nationalism a bad name. “Nationalistic” has joined the epithets used by Western commentators to describe the Law and Justice party, alongside “xenophobic” and “populist.”
It’s easy to understand why the term has been applied. But it’s important to understand that the Polish government, in trying to pose as the defender of Polish sovereignty, has abused and distorted Polish nationalism. That this has happened is a shame for many reasons — not least because nationalism was once widely recognized as one of Poland’s greatest virtues. One of the oldest political units in Europe, Poland had long cultivated a highly idiosyncratic sense of nationhood, one that over its thousand-year existence earned admiration far beyond its borders.
The current Polish government, however, has abandoned that tradition in favor of a legacy far more recent and far less deserving of emulation. Perversely, it has embraced the values and worldview of the communist regime whose influence it claims to most want to eradicate.
In the medieval era, Polish nationalism was based on loyalty to a royal dynasty and, in that sense, differed little from that of any other nation in Christendom. But with the coming of the Renaissance, Polish nationalism developed in tune with the rapid political changes taking place in the country, which had resulted in a republic with an elected constitutional monarchy and a remarkably pluralistic society. The Poles became patriots for a way of life — republican, multicultural, and multi-religious. Like Roman citizens in the glory days of Rome, the Polish gentry believed themselves to be members of an elite club. They looked with pity on their counterparts in neighboring countries obliged to put up with tyrannical rulers, high levels of taxation, enforced religious orthodoxy, and censorship. They also welcomed those of any nationality who wished to settle in Poland and share their blessings.
The 18th century saw Polish society divided between those who embraced Western European manners and taste along with the new secularist and rationalist zeitgeist, and a conservative backbone that clung to an increasingly beleaguered and xenophobic belief that everything traditional and “Polish” was best. By the end of the century, however, these divisions were transcended by the partition and abolition of the country under a combined assault by Poland’s three neighbors: Russia, Prussia, and Austria.
The loss of Polish statehood meant that “Poland” ceased being a country and instead became a cause — the cause of liberation. The cause aimed to subvert the conservative states that had assaulted it, and for ideological as well as practical reasons, it became revolutionary in character. National insurrections aimed at throwing off the foreign yoke — in 1794, 1830, 1846, and 1863 — involved ever-greater numbers of the peasantry. The 1905 uprising sprouted from working-class action.
Polish nationalists agreed that the only hope for liberation lay in engaging foreign support, but they disagreed over how to cultivate it: The more conservative sought to persuade powers such as Britain and France to intervene in favor of re-creating a Polish state, while the more radical encouraged revolution in other countries, believing that revolutionary governments would prove more likely allies. To this end, Polish patriots fought in the ranks of every single revolutionary movement in Europe and in both North and South America, often in dedicated units fighting under banners inscribed with the motto: “For Our Freedom and Yours.” The Polish Romantic poet Adam Mickiewicz gave this missionary zeal a religious twist by proclaiming that through its martyrdom Poland would redeem the world and in 1848 personally led a company of volunteers, clad in tunics adorned with a large white cross, fighting for the liberation of Italy.
Polish nationalism of this period was generous, inclusive, internationalist, exalted, almost metaphysical. It was also utterly ineffectual. All the heroics resulted only in the deaths of tens, if not hundreds of thousands of young men and in the prison, exile, and suffering for tens of thousands of others. Yet they did succeed in creating a legend, enhanced in the poetry, prose, and painting of the Romantic era and, indeed, in the music of such composers as Frederic Chopin. And this legend became deeply implanted in the Polish psyche.
In the second half of the 19th century, most of Polish society recognized the futility of armed action against oppressors who had grown into powerful empires underpinned by huge industrial and military might. 
Idealists armed with hunting rifles, old swords, and scythes were useless against machine guns and heavy artillery.
Idealists armed with hunting rifles, old swords, and scythes were useless against machine guns and heavy artillery. Those still committed to armed struggle resorted to conspiracy and terrorism, but many patriots channeled their aspirations into more organic politics.
The three imperial powers that occupied the area that had been the Polish state were bent on more or less aggressive assimilation of the indigenous population. This ranged from not allowing use of the Polish language in schools to banning its use in public and, in the case of Russia, of forced conversions to Orthodoxy. The Poles responded by setting up parallel educational programs, developing cultural activity of every kind, recording Polish history, but also encouraging better economic practices and a stronger work ethic. Polish nationalism had now morphed into a program of self-improvement — physical, intellectual, and economic. It also acquired a new religious connection. For most of the 19th century, when Polish elites were routinely persecuted or in exile, the humble parish priest was often the only educated person in rural areas, the only one able to give advice or provide education, and the church was often the only place where Polish could be spoken and sung. The Catholic Church had become both Trojan horse and buttress of the Polish resistance, functions it was to fulfill again from 1939 to 1945 and 1945 to 1989.
But ethnic Poles were not the only ones to inhabit the area. Before the country had been dismantled, it was home to large minorities of Lithuanians, Byelorussians, Germans, and Jews, to mention only the more important groups. And many members of these minorities responded to the threat of assimilation by Russia, Prussia, or Austria by rallying to their own national causes. This had the effect of making Poland’s various nationalisms increasingly defensive and competitive, which greatly complicated the nation’s life when Poland regained its independence in 1918.
Once again, outside events, this time in the shape of World War II, transformed the face of Polish nationalism, this time in insidious ways. Having only recently recovered their sovereignty, the Poles were determined to defend it. Poland was the first to fight Nazi Germany, and, unlike so many European states that either changed sides or submitted to German rule under pressure, Poles fought loyally alongside the victorious allies to the very end. This entailed a cost most people outside the country will have difficulty comprehending: selective genocide by both the Nazis and the Soviets, the death of more than 20 percent of the population, the destruction of some 75 percent of the country’s infrastructure, and a similar proportion of its cultural heritage. Worst of all, Poland was treated as one of the war’s losers: It lost a third of its territory and remained under foreign domination for another 45 years, until 1989.
Poles felt deeply wronged by this outcome — even more so by the fact that few in the world felt sympathy for their plight. This was because the real victors had written history. In order to disguise its own alliance with the Nazis and its subsequent attack on Poland, Soviet Russia, together with its puppet regime in Warsaw, produced a version of events between 1939 and 1945 that essentially placed the blame for everything that had happened at the door of the pre-war Polish state. They represented it as a “feudal” and crypto-fascist dictatorship that needed liberation by the Soviets.
All those who had fought on behalf of Poland, including the heroic Armia Krajowa, or Home Army,  were labeled as fascists in disguise and Nazi collaborators. Tens of thousands of war heroes were executed and many more thrown into jail for long terms. The surviving prewar elites, artistic and intellectual as well as social and economic, were viciously persecuted. And in the West, where Soviet prestige soared on heroic tales of Stalingrad and wartime propaganda, many accepted Moscow’s version of events, to which was added the tag of Polish anti-Semitism, magnified out of all proportion by the fact that all the German death camps were situated on Polish territory.
The communist regime in Poland created its own mongrel form of Polish nationalism out of various strands from the past.
The communist regime in Poland created its own mongrel form of Polish nationalism out of various strands from the past. In order to deflect resentment from the Soviet Union, it built up a legend of Germany as the eternal aggressor and vital enemy of Poland, encouraging historians to identify and magnify evidence of this dating back more than a thousand years. Coming at the end of six years of bestial German occupation, this fell on fertile soil and flourished in several generations of Poles as a fundamental grudge that is still detectable in the behavior of some politicians today. In parallel, the regime actively nourished the Poles’ sense of wrong at having been let down by their Western allies.
The postwar regime tried to channel Poland’s old Romantic legend of internationalist liberation to a supposed brotherhood of communist nations including members of the Warsaw Pact and countries like Cuba struggling in the revolutionary cause. But these propaganda efforts did not arouse much emotion among Poles, most of whom were cynical to say the least about their country’s supposed friendship with Russia. The more educated had access to Western sources of information and even the humblest had seen the barbarism of the Red Army and the Soviet secret police firsthand. Despite an attempt to pin the crime on the Nazis and a subsequent blanket ban on any mention of it in public, the murder of thousands of Polish officers at Katyn in 1940 was talked about widely, not just by the families of those who had perished.
For many, Katyn became the overarching symbol of the great wrong that had been done to Poland — by the Soviet Union but also by the West, whose officials pretended to accept the Soviet version of events. For some, the desire to expose the massacre at Katyn, and other crimes perpetrated against the country, became a fetish, a desire uncoupled from restraint and responsibility. This became especially apparent beginning in 1989, when Poland regained its independence, and its new ruling circles, which could still barely believe in the miracle that had brought them to power, were unwilling to prosecute, or draw attention to, the entire litany of Soviet crimes for fear of provoking a backlash by its larger neighbor.
This initiated the deep rift in Polish society evident today. On one side stand those who themselves or whose parents had participated in the running of postwar Poland to a greater or lesser extent; those who had managed to reach a modus vivendi with a system they did not particularly like; those who subliminally imbibed much of the communist regime’s propaganda about the prewar “feudal” and “fascist” regime; and those, including many of the educated youth, who have achieved professional or economic success in the past 25 years and who believe Poland should embrace the future, by means of the European Union, and treat the past as history.
On the other are those who either cannot or will not forget the sense that Poland has been wronged, who feel, like so many on the left, that victimhood equates with the moral high ground. A great many people have either not tried or not been able to build a place for themselves in the post-1989 world and hark back to supposedly less wicked times, even to the days of communist rule, when everybody had a job, when everyone was subject to the same hardships, and when, because of the way the media functioned, unpleasant aspects of life were unknown.
The two main parties that contested the last elections are not political parties in any meaningful sense of the word. They do not have identifiably different economic or social policies and are both heavily marked by communist-inspired hatred of the prewar Polish state. The principal difference between them lies in their outlook and sense of Polish nationhood. The Civic Platform party, which lost the elections, is dominated by people who tend to be uncomfortable with Poland’s past and aspire above all to be “good Europeans.” The victorious Law and Justice party attracts people who cannot or will not forget the wrongs of World War II; people who find the idea of the secular, liberal Western world too challenging and seek comfort in a sort of provincialism that wraps itself in religious and patriotic slogans; and also a great many who simply cannot stand the other party and its ostentatiously pro-European and cosmopolitan mindset — much the same electorate, in other words, as that which supports UKIP in Britain or the National Front in France. Needless to say, they have been greatly reinforced in their prejudices by the sallies of Western, and particularly German, journalists and commentators, which fit perfectly into the communist scenario anyone over the age of 35 was brought up with.
Polish nationalism has had dark moments, times when it was dominated by aggression. But it is no accident that Polish nationalism has primarily been more about the defense of a set of values than about blood or soil: Over the centuries, it was primarily Poland’s liberal political values and way of life that came under attack, because neighboring states felt threatened by them. It was so during the Reformation and the counter-Reformation, and it was so in all conflicts with the Soviet Union and Germany. During World War II, Hitler and Stalin did their utmost to annihilate the nation, because they feared its freethinking individualism and knew it would never march in lockstep with their totalitarian ideologies.
The country’s present governing circles have skillfully deployed the symbols and slogans of mission, martyrdom, and sovereignty to attract that part of the public which feels betrayed and left behind by history. Enlisting the Catholic hierarchy in what they portray as a defense of the Polish way of life and Polish values turned out to have been a brilliant electoral ploy. They will probably go on beating the drum of sovereignty in order to maintain their momentum. But it’s important to recognize how tenuous the government’s claim to authentic Polish nationalism really is. It has little sense of its own country’s long history and an impoverished notion of national mission. And in a bitter irony, the key elements of its political program, to control the life of the nation and to keep the outside world at arm’s length, derive less from the wellsprings of Polish nationhood than from the mindset of the postwar communist regime it says it most despises. 

Holocaust- The Liberation Of Auschwitz

AUSCHWITZ-BIRKENAU MEMORIAL AND MUSEUM