NORTON META TAG

Showing posts with label UNCLOS. Show all posts
Showing posts with label UNCLOS. Show all posts

04 November 2015

China Should Be Concerned About the Hague Tribunal & U.S. Admiral, in Beijing, Defends Patrols in South China Sea 4 & 3NOV15

Map showing disputed territory in the South China Sea
THE prc china is a serious threat to the military, political and economic stability of East and Southeast Asia. This ruling by The Hague court is a judicial warning to the prc leadership in Beijing that they are expected to follow the rules of international law and not the nationalistic sentiment of the nation. The U.S. and our allies have the responsibility to "show our flags" in these disputed waters as allowed by UNCLOS to remind the prc they do not decide the law of the sea, international treaties and courts do. From +The Huffington Post and the +NewYorkTimes 

China Should Be Concerned About the Hague Tribunal

Posted: Updated:
On October 29th, in a unanimous decision, the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague issued its first, preliminary ruling concerning whether the Tribunal has 'jurisdiction' over the issues raised by the Philippines against China's so called 'nine-dash line' in the South China Sea. The Tribunal held that in about half of the Philippines' fifteen claims, it did have jurisdiction. The other claims will be treated as jurisdictional questions fused with the merits of the case, and the Tribunal will be rendering a final award in 2016. The Tribunal's preliminary award on jurisdiction and admissibility should prove to be a clear victory for international law, as well as a clear defeat for Chinese unilateralism.
Given that the award was designed to address threshold issues about jurisdiction, it quickly led to a belief among those in Beijing that The Hague court will eventually be deciding against Chinese interests. Last week, Beijing's vice foreign minister aired similar concerns. Many observers see this as a perfect test case for a rules-based approach to managing future regional conflict. It may well also set the stage for reigning in China's 'unique' interpretation of international maritime law, which ignores nearly universally held concepts of territorial boundaries, Exclusive Economic Zones, and freely navigable international waters.
Had the Hague Tribunal denied itself jurisdiction, it would have legitimized China's effective occupation of the South China Sea under a claim of 'historical rights', based on old historical maps that did not encompass modern maritime law. An adverse ruling would likely have emboldened China to go even further than it already has in the South China Sea and claim rights to other bodies of water, as if they were a natural extension of China's land mass.
Surrounding littoral states would thereafter be forced to pursue a naval arms race as the next best option under concepts of self-help. Japan did just that, in September, with a reinterpretation of the country's post-war constitution to remove limitations on overseas combat. The Japanese Self Defense Forces may now provide limited defense assistance for its allies - a move clearly driven by a concern about China's unilateralism in the South China Sea.
There is no doubt that the arbitration case is taking place within the context of a larger set of diplomatic and regional issues between China and six other parties to the South China Sea dispute. The Tribunal took the position that a portion of those issues (maritime entitlement issues only) can be subject to a compulsory ruling under the UN Convention of the Law on the Sea (UNCLOS). This will mean that UNCLOS, a regime which is referred to as the 'constitution of the seas and oceans', will shape and inform greater regional diplomatic questions which happen to bear little relation to UNCLOS. The Tribunal was thus able to advance the notion that UNCLOS regimes can produce ripple effects that may positively shape grander, unrelated outcomes in regional and international relations.
China must now be concerned about whether, and how much, a ruling against it may spill over to other maritime issues occurring between it and other countries in other seas. This is particularly the case with Japan regarding disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, as well as whether China can proceed with the construction of offshore gas platforms in the East China Sea.
Since the ruling, China has made no change in its posture that the South China Sea is part of its territory. It seems clear, however, that Beijing fully understands the potential impact of international tribunals on its ability to project its power abroad on its own terms, which is why it did not agree to take the matter with the Philippines to The Hague in the first place. This is the first time China is facing international legal scrutiny over its extra territorial activity. The initial Chinese reaction to the ruling reveals that China continues to struggle to come to terms with the operation of compulsory norms and processes of public international law, especially vis-a-vis treaties to which it belongs, such as UNCLOS.
It looks increasingly likely that China will lose in The Hague next year. If so, it is fair to ask whether Beijing will rise to the occasion and be a graceful loser or remain obstinate in the face of overwhelming opposition to its actions in the South China Sea. China's maritime disputes in Asian waters will ultimately prove to be a litmus test for whether China will act as a responsible member of the international community, willing to engage other contestants in a rules-based regime in accordance with established norms of international relations and diplomacy, and consistent with a nation of its importance and stature. This was, and remains, China's challenge.
*Edsel Tupaz is a public interest attorney and legal academic in Manila. Daniel Wagner is CEO of Country Risk Solutions in the U.S.

U.S. Admiral, in Beijing, Defends Patrols in South China Sea


BEIJING — The head of the United States Pacific Command, Adm. Harry B. Harris Jr., said in Beijing on Tuesday that the Navy would continue to conduct freedom of navigation operations similar to one in the South China Sea last week that China criticized.


Speaking to a small audience at the Stanford Center at Peking University, Admiral Harris defended the operation last week, which involved sending a destroyer inside the 12-nautical-mile radius that China claims as its territorial waters around Subi Reef, an artificial island built by the Chinese in the South China Sea.
“We’ve been conducting freedom of navigation operations all over the world for decades, so no one should be surprised by them,” Admiral Harris said. “The South China Sea is not, and will not, be an exception.”
Admiral Harris emphasized that the United States had carried out such operations around the world “while avoiding military conflict, and that remains our goal.”


Admiral Harris arrived in China on Monday night for a long-planned visit that is part of regular exchanges between senior American and Chinese military officials. The admiral is an outspoken advocate of freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea and accused China this year of building “a great wall of sand” in the strategic waterway, a reference to artificial islands that the Chinese have constructed.

Photo

Adm. Harry B. Harris Jr., right, who oversees the United States Pacific Command, and Max Baucus, United States ambassador to China, in Beijing on Tuesday. Credit Pool photo by Andy Wong

Coinciding with Admiral Harris’s visit, the Foreign Ministry in Beijing had unusually scathing comments about the American destroyer’s mission.
“What has been unfolding lately is just like watching a self-orchestrated, self-directed, self-performed show,” the ministry’s spokeswoman, Hua Chunying, said at a regularly scheduled briefing on Tuesday.
An estimated 100,000 ships travel “safely and freely” through the South China Sea a year, she said, adding that millions of barrels of oil also pass through the waterway daily. “They run into no problem at all,” she said.
In an apparent effort by the Obama administration to insulate the admiral’s visit, the Pacific Command and the Pentagon kept Admiral Harris’s itinerary largely under wraps during the first day.
His address at the Stanford Center, which is operated by Stanford University, the alma mater of the American ambassador, Max Baucus, was closed to the news media.
A transcript released afterward indicated that Admiral Harris took questions from the audience, but the contents of that discussion were not available, a spokesman at the United States Embassy said.
About 15 professors and students from Peking University, all Chinese, were in the audience, and 15 scholars studying at Stanford in California, all American, listened by video, said Andrew J. Andreasen, the executive director of the center.
At the end of Admiral Harris’s day in Beijing, the Pacific Command said that he had met separately with Gen. Fang Fenghui, chief of the general staff of the People’s Liberation Army, and Gen. Fan Changlong, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission.

Interactive Feature

What China Has Been Building in the South China Sea

China has been feverishly piling sand onto reefs in the South China Sea for the past year, creating seven new islets in the region. It is straining geopolitical tensions that were already taut.
OPEN Interactive Feature

“It was a candid, respectful and substantive dialogue between military professionals,” said Capt. Darryn James, the chief Pacific Command spokesman.
According to the website of the Chinese military’s flagship newspaper, The People’s Liberation Daily, General Fan told Admiral Harris that the American warship had posed a threat to China’s territorial sovereignty and could “easily trigger miscalculations and accidents.”
While Admiral Harris has frequently spoken about the need for freedom of navigation operations to challenge China’s claims in the South China Sea, the Obama administration is also trying to prevent relations with the Chinese military from deteriorating.
In his speech, Admiral Harris said that two Chinese vessels, including a Navy hospital ship, the Peace Ark, were visiting American ports. The commander of the United States Pacific Fleet, Adm. Scott H. Swift, will visit Shanghai this month, he said.
“We must not allow the areas where China and the U.S. disagree to impact our ability to make progress on the areas where we do agree,” he said.
The dispatch of the destroyer Lassen last week to the waters inside the 12-nautical-mile perimeter of Subi Reef was meant to show that China could not claim territorial waters on an artificial island built from what is known as a low-tide elevation. Before the construction, Subi Reef was visible only during low tide.
A Chinese Navy vessel followed the Lassen as it entered the waters but did not interfere with its operations. The Chinese military objected to the operation, saying it was “illegal” and a “provocation.” The Foreign Ministry called in the American ambassador, Mr. Baucus, and made a formal objection.
A professor at Peking University, Jia Qingguo, who was in the audience for Admiral Harris’s talk, said the Chinese government had made clear that the operation by the Lassen had endangered China’s national security.
“China thinks the two countries should enhance communication and mutual trust rather than doing things like this to escalate the situation,” said Mr. Jia, the dean of the school of international studies at Peking University.
China has constructed seven artificial islands on top of submerged reefs in the Spratly archipelago, where the Philippines and several other governments also have claims. A military-size runway has been completed on one of the new islands, and China is working on runways on two more.


Related Coverage


15 November 2013

Why Is China Giving the Philippines the Cold Shoulder? 13NOV13

THE prc hasn't hesitated to show it's true character in it's response to the humanitarian crisis the Philippines is dealing with in the wake of Typhoon Haiyan. They do it to warn their neighbors not to challenge them, ever, or they will pay. This should be a warning to the U.S. too. Exports from the prc to the U.S. only strengthen the chinese military and their aggressive actions. Think about it. If walmart, with it's domination of pricing and products offered in the American economy hadn't led the stampede of U.S. manufacturing to the prc would they have a world class aircraft carrier and an expanding modern navy? The American consumer is financing the prc's military buildup. The U.S. military is also financing the prc military by using chinese ports for resupplying our boats and R&R for our sailors in the South China Sea. That makes as much sense as if we would use Iranian ports for our fleet in the Persian Gulf. As long as corporate America and American consumers continue to be unpatriotically greedy the prc's aggressiveness toward it's neighbors and the U.S. will grow. From Foreign Policy magazine....

Embroiled in a nasty legal fight over the South China Sea, Beijing is putting Manila on notice -- even in the midst of tragedy.

BY DAVID BOSCO | NOVEMBER 13, 2013

In the wake of the devastating Typhoon Haiyan, international aid is flowing to the Philippines. The United Nations released $25 million from an emergency fund and the United States pledged $20 million in immediate relief. But, for the moment at least, precious little assistance is coming from the region's behemoth. The Chinese authorities announced a paltry $100,000 in humanitarian aid (along with another $100,000 via the Red Cross Society of China). Beijing's cold shoulder fits with a broader diplomatic isolation of Manila, which China has shepherded. In recent months, China's foreign minister has met with all 10 counterparts from the Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) member-states -- except the Philippines. A key point of friction has been the Philippines' willingness to challenge Beijing's maritime claims.
The most dangerous flashpoint came in the spring of 2012, when vessels from the Philippines and China engaged in a weeks-long standoff over waters near the Scarborough Shoal, a rocky formation little more than 100 miles from the Philippines' Subic Bay, the once (and perhaps future) home of a U.S. Navy base. The incident began when Filipino sailors boarded a Chinese vessel fishing in what the Philippines considers its own maritime economic zone. After an unnerving naval escalation, the confrontation ended a few months later with China in effective control of the disputed waters. 
The incident revealed just how badly the Philippines is outmatched at sea. Partly in response, the Philippines wants to upgrade its military cooperation with the United States. "We stand ready to tap every resource, to call on every alliance to do what is necessary to defend what is ours," Filipino Foreign Minister Albert del Rosario said in August. The government is also snapping up second-hand vessels to bolster its own fleet. But these moves won't change the archipelago's lack of wherewithal to challenge China's claims. Beijing boasts an expanding and modernizing naval fleet, and in August, Chinese president Xi Jinping inspected the country's first aircraft carrier. A Ministry of National Defense spokesman said "there will surely be more in the future."
But if on the high seas Manila is at a profound disadvantage, the courtroom may level the playing field. In the realm of international law, the power balance is often less tilted, and that is where the Philippines has turned. In January, the Philippines foreign minister informed China's ambassador that the country was filing suit against China. Beijing angrily rejected the claim and has vowed not to participate in the case, insisting on its "indisputable sovereignty" in the area. But the case is moving forward nonetheless, and every state with an interest in Asia's troubled waters is watching closely. For all Beijing's bluster, the Philippines stands a good chance of denting China's maritime claims.
The Chinese claims in the South China Sea are embodied in the now notorious "nine-dash line" that China first formally presented internationally in 2009. The gigantic U-shape marks what China views as its maritime entitlements in the area. It encompasses nearly 90 percent of the South China Sea, including rich fishing grounds and areas with potential oil, gas, and mineral deposits. China claims exclusive rights in waters only a few dozen miles from the Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam -- three nations which all object to China's claims.
The foundations for the nine-dash line are convoluted, and lean as much on ancient history as they do on modern law. Two Chinese scholars recently traced Chinese influence in the sea as far back as the 5th century A.D. Through its legal case, the Philippines aims to expose the gap between these venerable claims and the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which provides rules for what states can claim as territorial seas (which extend 12 miles from shore) and as "exclusive economic zones" (which normally extend 200 miles).
China might simply insist that UNCLOS doesn't apply, but for the inconvenient fact that China (unlike the United States) has ratified the treaty. Even less convenient from Beijing's perspective, joining UNCLOS committed China to an international arbitration process for disputes related to the agreement. With its January filing, the Philippines set that process in motion, and a group of experienced arbitrators has assembled to review the case.  
It's no surprise the Philippines was the only aggrieved state willing to sue the Asian behemoth: it is by far the most assertive of the smaller countries with an interest in the South China Sea. In 2012 it pushed hard for a statement by ASEAN on the maritime disputes, leading to the group's embarrassing failure to release a joint statement at the conclusion of that year's summit -- and plenty of hard feelings on all sides.
Diplomatic support for the case in the region -- even among states angered by China's claims -- has been muted, because of concerns that the Philippines arbitration "might have negative repercussions for ASEAN-China relations," wrote Ian Storey, a senior fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Wary of Beijing's influence, most ASEAN states have called blandly for a peaceful resolution of the dispute. If the Philippines had hoped that fellow skeptics of the nine-dash line would line up behind their lawsuit, they have been disappointed.
China's political and economic weight accounts for the diplomatic reticence, but the complexity of the legal issues may also be discouraging states from rallying to Manila's side. Chinese officials -- and some independent maritime law scholars -- argue that the international arbitrators have no jurisdiction. They point in particular to a set of restrictions on arbitration that China announced in 2006. These restrictions, which China is within its legal rights to assert, preclude arbitrations related to maritime "delimitation," military activities, certain types of historical claims, and questions of sovereignty over territory.  
At first glance, those restrictions poke several holes in the Filipino case. University of Bonn scholar Stefan Talmon wrote in May that Manila's claims "cannot be decided without deciding on matters outside the jurisdiction of the tribunal." The prohibition on arbitrators considering "historic bays and titles" -- one of the categories UNCLOS allows states to exclude from arbitration -- seems almost designed to immunize Beijing's history-based claims in the South China Sea.
The Philippines is convinced, however, that it has found a way through these jurisdictional obstacles. The government signed up a veteran litigator of maritime disputes to fashion the complaint and argue their case. Washington D.C.-based lawyer Paul Reichler has previously represented Nicaragua, Bangladesh, Mauritius, Guyana, and Croatia in disputes involving maritime issues. When I spoke to him recently, he walked me through Manila's case and explained why none of China's restrictions on jurisdiction should prevent the arbitrators from ruling on the case.
He dealt first with the question of whether China's alleged historical rights in the South China Sea will prevent the arbitrators from considering the case, insisting that the UNCLOS notion of "historic title" has a very narrow meaning. "States can't claim historical title in the open ocean," he says. "The concept applies only to waters very close to the coast that have historically been regarded as a State's internal waters."
Reichler also maintains that the case is not about delimitation of maritime boundaries, which is excluded from arbitration, but about the distinct process of determining what China's and the Philippines' entitlements in the South China Sea are under UNCLOS (you can't delimit maritime boundaries without first determining entitlements, Reichler points out). Nor is the Philippines asking the arbitrators to rule on the sovereignty of several disputed islands in the South China Sea. Instead, the Philippines wants the tribunal to distinguish between islands, rocks, and permanently submerged features. UNCLOS provides clear guidance for making those distinctions, which hinge on whether the formation in question is permanently above water and can sustain human life and economic activity.
Some observers believe the Philippines has threaded the legal needle. "I am optimistic that the arbitrators will decide they have jurisdiction to hear at least some of the issues presented by the Philippines," says Peter Dutton, a law of the sea expert at the U.S. Naval War College. He expects the tribunal will find that the Philippines "does have rightful claims to the resources in some of the waters within China's nine-dash line."
There are practical reasons the arbitrators might seek to avoid ruling on the dispute. China's refusal to participate sends an important signal about its intentions, and the arbitrators might balk at putting Beijing on a collision course with UNCLOS. But if the panel does rule in favor of the Philippines, the dispute will change. The nine-dash line won't merely be exorbitant -- it will be legally dubious.
Beijing might shift tack and adopt a more conciliatory approach. Indeed, the arbitration process is slow, and there's plenty of time left for diplomacy. But China's cold response to the tragedy of Typhoon Haiyan doesn't provide much ground for optimism.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/12/why_is_china_giving_the_philippines_the_cold_shoulder_typhoon_relief?page=full