THIS system will never be fixed because the military-industrial complex doesn't want it to be fixed. The federal deficit be damned, fixing the Defense procurement problems will cut into their obscene corporate pay and compensation packages and profit margins. And don't forget the employment future of the politicians they they have bought and paid for, after all, they can't be expected to retire on their Congressional pensions, they want their cut of the fraud, waste, and cost overruns they directed to the these contractors. This entire system is corrupt, if it wasn't it wouldn't have survived intact after the Packard Commission report.
By Walter Pincus
In June 1986, after a year-long investigation, then-President Ronald
Reagan’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management — later known as
the Packard Commission — filed a final report.
It was established to investigate Pentagon procurement after an
enormous increase in defense spending and the discovery of the infamous
$435 hammer and $600 toilet seat. The panel was chaired by David
Packard, co-founder of Hewlett-Packard Co., and deputy defense secretary
in the Nixon administration.
Its declaration: “The Department of
Defense’s acquisition system continues to take longer, cost more and
deliver fewer quantities and capabilities than originally planned.”
Among causes listed were “stifling burdens of regulation, reporting and
oversight.”
Last month, a Defense Business Board task force,
established a year ago by the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Adm. James A. Winnefeld Jr., reported exactly the same
“unacceptable” finding. The task force conclusion came after a study
that included 221 interviews and review of 300 past studies and
commission findings.
Its declaration: The Defense Department
“acquisition system continues to take longer, cost more, get less and
oftentimes not what is needed.”
What can be more boring than
reading about yet another set of recommendations for fixing a system
that over the past decade has seen the Defense Department flooded with
funds. It’s been so flush that it could walk away from $50 billion worth
of “weapons that either did not work or were overtaken by new
requirements given the average 15-to-18 year development cycle,”
according to the Punaro task force report.
And — yawn — the
overruns are hardly over. This is in spite of the need to reduce defense
spending. More yawn-inducing reality: The Government Accountability
Office recently reported current major weapons systems will show a cost
growth of $135 billion before they are fully integrated into the system.
Boring and frustrating. It was time to do something 26 years
ago. The only major lasting memorial to the Packard Commission is its
recommendation for an undersecretary of defense for acquisition. The
Pentagon has had one since that time, but the problems remain.
“Today
there is no rational system whereby the Executive Branch and the
Congress reach coherent and enduring agreement on national military
strategy, the forces to carry it out, and the funding that should be
provided — in light of the overall economy and competing claims on
national resources.”
This was the Packard Commission more than two
decades ago. The same idea is in the Punaro report. The task force was
chaired by Arnold Punaro, a former long-time top staff member of the
Senate Armed Services Committee, director of SAIC Inc., a defense
contractor, and a retired Marine Corps Reserve major general.
But
no one is going to read the report. Its title alone is a snoozer:
“Linking and Streamlining the Defense Requirements, Acquisition, and
Budget Processes.”
Of course, it should be read, but let’s face it: There’s nothing sexy about a subject that drains billions from the budget.
Of
the fiscal 2013 Defense budget, some $400 billion is for procurement,
research and development, goods and services, according to the Punaro
study.
The Pentagon carries out some 1,200 contracting activities
from building ships to cutting edge technologies to consumables,
services, repair parts and day-to-day needs.
Some 152,000
military and civilian personnel work in acquisitions, including 30,000
contract officials and another 16,000 in program management.
Yawn. Yawn. Yawn.
No
one could provide the task force the number of contractors supporting
these people though the Defense Department’s “best guesstimate is
roughly 766,000 contractors at a cost of about $155 billion,” according
to the Punaro report. The handbook for acquisition officers is 962
pages, and federal acquisition regulations runs over 4,000 pages.
The Punaro task force’s first recommendation: “Zero base the entire system, including all directives and regulations.”
At
the heart of that suggestion is the conclusion that procurement’s three
processes are broken — the military set requirements, followed by an
essentially civilian-directed acquisition, along with a hybrid budgeting
system to pay for it.
The Punaro Task Force proposed that
requirements, acquisition and budgeting be merged with a common
documentation throughout. It also recommended requirements be frozen,
after cost, schedule and technical tradeoffs have been made. Industry is
to be brought early into the process, and the current wall between
military requirements and civilian-controlled acquisition should be
removed. Service chiefs should be involved throughout the process.
Still awake? We all should be — and particularly Congress.
“Congress
should work to recodify all federal statutes governing procurement into
a single government-wide procurement statute ... aim[ed] not only at
consolidation, but more importantly at simplification and consistency.”
That’s the Packard Commission from 26 years ago.
It’s time to pay attention.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/defense-procurement-problems-wont-go-away/2012/05/02/gIQAyQNvxT_print.html
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